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Abstract 
The overwhelming majority of the more than five and a half million Syrians have fled to 
neighboring countries in the Middle East without their civil documents. Particularly in a 
refugee context, it is crucial for the standard of living for Syrian refugees and eventual return 
to Syria to be adequately documented. Complex civil registration systems in the host countries, 
however, often prevent Syrian refugees from obtaining civil documentation, thereby expanding 
the problem of the lack and loss of civil documentation of Syrian refugees. This thesis examines 
the different civil registration systems and their consequences for Syrian refugees in Jordan, 
Turkey, and Lebanon through an in-depth analysis focusing on legal status, marriage and birth 
registration. This thesis argues that the difference in implemented civil registration systems is 
determined by each host country’s social, political, and economic situation before and during 
the Syrian refugee influx and the extent to which the Syrian refugees have impacted the 
country, positively and negatively. In Turkey, the government has adopted a temporary 
protection regime, which includes refugee-sensitive civil registration systems. However, in 
Lebanon and to a lesser extent Jordan, Syrian refugees are still facing many challenges trying 
to obtain civil documentation due to the complex civil registration systems. As the eight years 
of hosting refugees has turned out more harmful than beneficial for the host countries, 
discussions on the return of Syrian refugees has increasingly become louder. However, a lot of 
change is still required to ensure that Syrian refugees are adequately documented.  
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List of Abbreviations  
AFAD   Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency 
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Glossary  
Deftar ha'ila  Family booklet that records all members of a family in one document.  
Hawiya  National ID card for all Syrians above the age of 14 
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Ketb al-ktab  Islamic marriage contract 
Kimlik   Turkish ID card, in thesis used as the temporary protection ID card  
Mokhtar   Local Mayor 
Non-refoulement Fundamental principle of international law that forbids a country 
receiving asylum seekers from returning them to a country in which they 
would be in likely danger of persecution 
Sheikh   A religious leader in a Muslim community 
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Introduction  
No one expected the civil uprising that gradually commenced in Syria in 2011, to turn into a 
full-scale civil war with international involvement. Currently, eight years later, the disastrous 
scope of the ongoing conflict has become clear. Its impact has created a humanitarian crisis, 
which by many is called the worst humanitarian crisis the world has ever faced. Consequently, 
Syrians are currently the largest forcibly displaced population in the world, as more than half 
of the pre-war population has been forced to flee their homes (Mercy Corps, 2018). The images 
and stories are well-known: civilians that leave behind everything, fleeing from war-torn cities 
in search of safety and a better future. Sometimes these civilians even risk their lives trying to 
reach Europe with unsafe boats. However, a less obvious and highly underreported 
consequence of conflict is the lack and loss of civil documentation. Around 70 per cent of the 
Syrian refugees that have fled to neighboring countries lack basic identity documents. The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) describes this situation as a 
“ticking time-bomb”, as proper civil documentation is of major importance for the lives of 
refugees, the establishment of identity, and the prevention of statelessness.  
 
To be recognised as a person before the law is one of the most basic human rights adopted in 
several international law treaties. Through civil registration systems, governments allow 
persons to obtain a legal identity. Civil documentation enables persons to hold legal proof of 
their own legal identity. This legal proof is crucial to claim human rights under law, first and 
foremost the right to a nationality, but also other rights, such as the right to travel, to work, to 
move freely, to vote, etc. In addition, civil documentation grants a person access to 
governmental services, such as access to healthcare, education, and social benefits. Successful 
registration of live events, such as births and marriages, is solely possible with adequate civil 
documentation. In a refugee context, however, civil documents are often (deliberately) 
destroyed, lost, confiscated, or forgotten, as a result of conflict and the subsequent forced 
displacement. Yet, particularly for refugees, proper civil documentation is crucial to receive 
effective protection in host countries. Without proper documentation, refugees are often not 
even able to enter a country through regular channels and face many challenges trying to obtain 
legal residency and/or refugee status, to access humanitarian assistance, and to access services.  
Moreover, refugees are unable to successfully complete civil registration systems, for instance 
birth registration, if they are not in the possession of the required civil documents.  
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As the overwhelming majority of the more than five and a half million Syrians have fled to 
neighboring countries in the Middle East without their civil documents, the magnitude of the 
problem requests adequate response. To lower the number of undocumented Syrian refugees, 
host countries have been required to adopt inclusive and efficient civil registration systems, 
that incorporate refugee-sensitive procedures. Especially, as adequate documentation would 
facilitate better integration in their societies and safe return to Syria after the end of the conflict. 
However, this would have been the case in an ideal world. In reality, host countries have been 
overwhelmed by the sudden responsibility the Syrian refugee influx formed. Many countries 
have closed their borders to Syrian refugees and as a result, the majority remained in the direct 
region. The Syrian refugee influx has placed a heavy burden on these countries, which often 
already struggled with political instability and structural challenges, such as (youth) 
unemployment, overburdened infrastructure, high pressure on social services etc. Depending 
on a variety of factors that continuously influence how host countries organize their refugee 
responses, complex civil registration systems have often been adopted. These complex civil 
registration systems in the host countries, however, often prevent Syrian refugees from 
obtaining civil documentation, particularly birth and marriage certificates, thereby expanding 
the problem of the lack and loss of civil documentation of Syrian refugees. These civil 
documents, however, are crucial to establish a good standard of living in the host countries. 
Moreover, civil documentation is crucial to prevent statelessness of Syrian refugees, 
particularly of children born to Syrian parents in exile to whom their link to Syria might be 
endangered.  
 
Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon are the three countries that have taken in the vast majority of the 
Syrian refugees. Regardless, each of these countries is characterized by its own historical, 
social, political and economic conditions. Although all three countries have been praised for 
taking in a large number of Syrian refugees, the level of commitment to properly host refugees 
have resulted in different degrees to which Syrian refugees have received protection in each 
host country. Depending on this level of commitment, each host country has implemented 
different civil registration systems. As civil documentation is often the key to a better life, these 
different civil registration systems have influenced the lives of Syrian refugees considerably. 
Yet, analyzes of these differences of civil registration systems and their impact on Syrian 
refugees has been highly neglected in academic work on the Syrian refugee crisis. 
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The majority of the conducted research on the Syrian refugee crisis has predominantly focused 
on the impact of the crisis on host countries. However, there is a lack of conducted academic 
research that focusses on the impact of host countries’ refugee responses on Syrian refugees 
themselves. Especially the lack and loss of civil documentation and the consequent challenges 
experienced during civil registration procedures are highly neglected. It must be acknowledged 
that the majority of research on the lack and loss of civil documentation of Syrian refugees and 
its consequences is conducted by (I)NGOs. Moreover, comparative academic research that 
focusses on civil registration systems as part of host countries’ refugee response is non-existent. 
Yet, it is important to analyze what factors influence countries to adopt and/or change their 
strategy regarding Syrian refugees, which also determines how and to what extent a host 
country is willing to facilitate inclusive and effective civil registration systems. Moreover, the 
results can contribute to positive pathways for host countries’ implementation of civil 
registration systems concerning refugees. In addition, is it crucial to gain insight in the 
significance of civil registration procedures on the quality of life of refugees in exile, as well 
as to what extent these refugees are in the possession of proper civil documentation. Moreover, 
in light of an ending crisis in Syria, it is crucial to understand the importance of civil 
documentation on the return of Syrians to their country and the role that host countries play in 
properly documenting refugees. Therefore, this thesis sheds light on the civil registration 
systems and the consequent documentation challenges faced by Syrian refugees by aiming to 
answer the following question: 
 
What explains the different implementation of civil registration systems for Syrian refugees in 
the host countries Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon?  
 
This thesis argues that the different implemented civil registration systems in Jordan, Turkey, 
and Lebanon are determined by each country’s social, political, and economic situation before 
and during the Syrian refugee influx and the extent to which the Syrian refugees have impacted 
the country, positively and negatively.  
 
The purpose of this Master’s thesis is three-fold. The first purpose is to develop insight into 
what reasons countries could have for the adoption of particular civil registration systems for 
Syrian refugees and so to explain why there are differences. Secondly, the purpose is to gain 
insight into the consequences of particular civil registration systems on the lives of Syrian 
refugees and the challenges Syrian refugees face while attempting to obtain civil 
documentation, thereby emphasizing on legal status, birth- and marriage certification. And 
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thirdly, the purpose is to gain a deeper understanding of the influence the lack and loss of civil 
documentation has on the lives of Syrians in exile  
 
This thesis is divided in a theoretical and an empirical part in order to answer the various 
research questions. In the first chapter, the theoretical background is provided, that gives 
understanding to the legal core of a person’s identity: the right to a nationality. This chapter 
includes an explanation of the notions of being stateless and being a refugee, and highlights 
the importance of civil documentation for a person’s legal identity. In addition, this chapter 
gives inside to the different motivations of governments while drawing up a strategy that deals 
with sudden refugee influx. The second chapter lays out the methodological approach of this 
thesis, which is inherently explanatory and explorative. In chapter three, the empirical part of 
the thesis is initiated. This chapter provides insight into the Syrian refugee crisis in light of the 
lack and loss of civil documentation. In addition, it provides an overview on the challenges 
Syrian refugees experience while obtaining civil documentation. In the following three 
chapters, a clear profile of each host country will elaborate on the factors that contribute to the 
development of different civil registration systems. By providing an overview of the civil 
registration systems, by focusing on legal status, birth registration, and marriage registration, 
an analysis is made on influential factors that shape governments to adopt the civil registration 
systems. Moreover, it will focus on the access to services for Syrian refugees as a result of the 
civil registration systems. In chapter four, the first case study on Jordan, is analyzed. Chapter 
five covers the second case study Turkey, which is followed by the case study on Lebanon in 
chapter six. Finally, with the outcome of the analysis of the three host countries, this thesis 
provides an answer to the research questions in the conclusion. 
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1 Background  
 
With the creation of international law, countries together have determined and defined general 
principles that safeguard humanity’s fundamental values, including the right to a nationality 
for all persons. Civil registration is the foundation of a person’s existence. Through its 
procedures, civil registration underlines the link to an identity and a nationality, even when a 
person is uprooted. Civil documents are considered the legal proof of a person’s nationality 
and grants access to civil registration. Within a refugee context, these civil documents are often 
missing, resulting in the need for adjusted civil registration systems. Yet, as international law 
is consent-based, some governments do not consider this their responsibility, contributing to 
the complex puzzle of the lack of loss of documentation for refugees. In order to understand 
this puzzle, this chapter will elaborate on the principles, the importance of documentation, and 
state strategy.    
 
1.1 What is a nationality? 
“Everyone has the right to a nationality”, on 10 December 1948, the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) adopted this resolution in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). The right to a nationality was first mentioned in the American Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of Man on 2 May 1948, therefore often called the main influencer of 
Article 15 of the UDHR. However, the principles of the right to a nationality had already 
emerged during the drafting process in 1947. In addition to the first paragraph of Article 15, 
the United Kingdom and India opted for an amendment in May 1948, resulting in the adoption 
of a second paragraph that states that “No one shall arbitrarily be deprived of his nationality 
nor denied the right to change his nationality” (Ganczer, 2015, pp. 15-17). Ever since, the right 
to a nationality has been mentioned in multiple international legal frameworks.1 In 1959, the 
UNGA adopted the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, which underlines a child’s right to 
a nationality at birth. Principle 3 states that “The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name 
and a nationality” (Ganczer, 2015, p. 18). While drafting the Declaration, it was mentioned that 
this Principle is subject to complex legal issues, as it fails to mention its application in different 
national legislation, which in certain states is based on jus soli, the right to obtain the nationality 
                                               
1 Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 8 of the 
Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children 
(1986), Article 29 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990), Article 18 in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (2006), and the frameworks mentioned in the text.  
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of the state in which a person is born, and in other states is based on jus sanguinis, according 
to which a person’s nationality is determined by the nationality of the parents (Veerman, 1992, 
p. 171).  
 
The in 1989 adopted Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was the first human rights 
document that linked the right to nationality to statelessness. Article 7 states that “the child 
shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right . . . to acquire a nationality.” 
Birth registration essentially protects a child’s right to an identity as it is part of effective civil 
registration to acknowledge the existence of a person (UNICEF, 2005, p. 1). Moreover, “states 
parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law 
and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular 
where the child would otherwise be stateless.” Despite national laws based on jus sanguinis, 
states are obliged to establish registration systems that safeguard a child’s ability to be 
registered at birth, as birth registration is a steppingstone to a nationality, granted by the same 
state or not. In addition, Article 8 states that appropriate assistance and protection should be 
given to a child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality (United Nations, 1989) 
(Ganczer, 2015, pp. 20-21). However, it is crucial to make a distinction between international 
law on paper and the willingness of states to translate these principles into action. The 
problematic issue of these legal documents is that it remains unclear which state has the 
obligation to provide a nationality to a person.  
 
1.2 What is statelessness? 
Worldwide, at least ten million people are not considered a national by any state under the 
operation of its law: they are stateless (UNHCR) (United Nations, 1954, p. Art. 1). The majority 
of states do not grant the same rights to stateless people as to their own citizens, which often 
have civil, political, economic, and social rights. Stateless persons are often denied access to 
education, employment opportunities, housing, healthcare, and social welfare, and do not have 
the right to vote, nor the freedom of movement (Weissbrodt & Collins, 2006, p. 248). In 1954, 
the cornerstone of international protection for stateless persons was laid with the adoption of 
the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (CSSP). The Convention established 
important minimum standards of treatment with regard to a number of rights, including the 
right to employment, education, freedom of religion, and housing (United Nations, 1954). 
Under the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, considered the leading 
international instruments concerning fighting statelessness, a set of rules have been established 
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for the prevention and reduction of statelessness. In a detailed manner, the Convention sets out 
safeguards to prevent statelessness in several different contexts, including regulation on how 
to bridge the gap between jus soli and jus sanguinis, by stating that nationality could either be 
granted at birth, or upon application with the appropriate authority.  
 
There are several causes of statelessness, including the inability to register due to 
administrative barriers and a lack of documentation, the inheritance of statelessness, 
discrimination against a particular group, and gender-based nationality law based on jus 
sanguinis. Another cause could be conflict between the nationality laws of two states, which 
occurs when a child is born in a state which grants nationality by descent,  jus sanguinis, while 
the parents hold nationality of a state that grants nationality by birth,  jus soli, leaving the child 
without a nationality (UNHCR, 1999, p. 3). Moreover, relatively new causes of statelessness 
have been identified due to complex temporary phenomena. During the Syrian conflict for 
instance, non-state actors, such as Local Councils in southern Syria and the Free Independent 
Judicial Council under the interim government in northern Syria, have become involved in 
executing civil registration systems. Yet, the questionable legitimacy and value of these 
documents could leave states without clear guidance on whether or not to accept these 
documents (Albarazi & van Waas, 2016, p. 30).  
 
1.3 What is a refugee? 
Globally, it is estimated that, in addition to the estimated 10 million stateless persons 
worldwide, at least 1.5 million stateless persons are also refugees. (Albarazi & van Waas, 2015, 
p. 7). Because of the overlap between stateless persons and refugees, initially, an ad hoc 
committee was established to draft international law on both categories combined. 
Nonetheless, two separate conventions were developed by the committee: the above mentioned 
1954 CSSP and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of the Refugees (CRSR)  
(Goldenziel, 2016, p. 596). Article 1 of the CRSR defines a refugee as “a person who has fled 
his or her country owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted.” Refugees often face 
physical, (psycho)social, and economic hardships in the process of fleeing their homes. Having 
fled to another country outside of the realm of possible protection by their own government, it 
is required of the other government to establish frameworks that protect refugees within its 
borders. Yet, the binding factor of the above mentioned legal documents is based on consent, 
which sometimes results in the absence of these kind of frameworks (Hathaway & Foster, 2014, 
pp. 24-25).  
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1.4 Civil documentation 
Due to the nature of displacement, refugees often live under uncertain, unstable, and unsafe 
conditions. Besides the earlier mentioned conflict of nationality laws, documentation 
challenges place immense pressure on refugees, increasing the risk of becoming stateless 
(Albarazi & van Waas, 2015, p. 16). As a result of conflict and subsequently forced 
displacement, refugees’ civil documents are often (deliberately) destroyed, lost, confiscated, 
or forgotten. Moreover, unaccompanied or orphaned children are among refugees which the 
majority of time, are unable to identify themselves due to the absence of any civil documents. 
Upon arrival in a new country, refugees may experience barriers to accessing civil registration 
procedures due to the lack or absence of required documents for obtaining legal residency, 
refugee status, nationality, and family lineage. Moreover, these civil documents are needed for 
refugees to gain access to services such as healthcare, education, and social benefits, and to be 
able to apply for work permits. Without proper documentation, effective protection of refugees 
fleeing from conflict, persecution, and natural disasters is likely to be more difficult. Often it 
is not even possible to flee to another country through legal access channels. Civil 
documentation in this context refers to the registration of life events such as birth, marriages 
and deaths, while identity documents are used to prove a person’s identity, such as ID cards, 
passports, or refugee ID cards (Manby, 2016, pp. 1, 8,12). 
 
With rapid influxes of refugees, as is witnessed after the start of the Syrian conflict, it is 
increasingly important to either strengthen existing civil registration systems or to establish 
efficient, inclusive, and fast civil registration systems to determine a “person’s eligibility for a 
particular status and to issue the appropriate documents” that align with international law and 
take away existing barriers for civil registration (Manby, 2016, p. 1). It is therefore crucial that 
refugees are able to register life events such as births, as this legal recognition of a child is 
generally required for obtaining other civil documents. In the situation of forced displacement, 
birth certificates could be necessary to prove someone’s nationality later on. Yet, birth 
registration is often still challenging in a refugee context. In certain countries, including Jordan 
and Lebanon, marriage registration counts as a precondition for birth registration. However, 
parents frequently lack awareness and knowledge of civil registration procedure, and/or have 
limited access to the right authorities due to the absence of legal residency (Albarazi & van 
Waas, 2015, pp. 19-20). 
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1.5 Governmental strategy: 
In essence, international treaties are solely binding when a state is signatory. It is therefore not 
illogic that states that host large refugee populations often have not signed international 
agreements concerning refugees and stateless persons, as it commits states to obligations. 
Particularly for governments that already experience political instability, and/or problems in 
providing services to their own citizens due to economic hardship, such as quality education, 
food subsidies, employment, water, and adequate housing, these obligations can be a serious 
hurdle, causing societal backlash on the government. Therefore, governments develop 
strategies in which they weigh their interests and compose appropriate responses to refugee 
influxes in a way that it benefits the state. The majority of times, host governments fear that 
refugee populations will remain permanently in their country. Consequently, governments 
have to choose to what extent they provide refugees with legal status, civil documentation, and 
access to services that will improve refugees’ living conditions. According to Giorgio 
Agamben’s theory of ‘the state of exception’, authorities are expanding their power through 
the suspension of the rule of law in order to solve a threatening crisis. By certain governments, 
refugee influxes are perceived as such security crises. In order to preserve the state, these 
governments allow themselves to implement special measures for refugees. Refugees are 
denied similar rights as citizens and deprived of any form of state protection (Wurts, 2016). 
However, contrary to this deterring strategy, which aims for refugees to not remain in the 
country, governments can also benefit from hosting and assisting refugee populations within 
their state borders. By maximizing the state’s access to refugee recourses, monetary support by 
third countries could be allocated to support both the refugee population and the host 
communities, and to build up the country’s infrastructure as a whole. Additionally, by 
integrating refugees in host communities, host countries have increased chances to receive 
support from development organisations, such as United Nations Development Progamme and 
the World Bank. The presence of aid agencies also generates resources, such as employment 
opportunities, increase demand of local services, and economic revenue. Moreover, a 
government’s role in a refugee crisis can generate both international as national recognition, 
while for certain leaders it can result in personal empowerment. Governments can use their 
positive role in a refugee crisis as leverage while negotiating agreements for the benefit of the 
country. Moreover, by embracing refugees as potential asset, rather than a burden, governments 
could utilize refugees’ skillset for the improvement and increase of economic activity 
(Jacobsen, 2002, pp. 593-594).  
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2 Methodology  
 
In this Syrian-refugee focused Master’s thesis, an in-depth multiple case-analysis will be made 
on civil documentation procedures in a regional context, namely Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. 
The purpose of this thesis is threefold: (1) to develop insight into what reasons countries could 
have for the adoption of particular civil registration systems for Syrian refugees and so to 
explain why there are differences, (2) to gain insight into the consequences of particular civil 
registration systems on the lives of Syrian refugees and the challenges Syrian refugees face 
while attempting to obtain civil documentation, and (3) to gain a deeper understanding of the 
influence the lack and loss of civil documentation has on the lives of Syrians in exile. A 
qualitative literature-based research design will be used in order to answer the research 
questions, which enables to focus on civil registration systems and consequent challenges in a 
detailed manner. As a qualitative research not only allows to provide descriptive and detailed 
information but is also the appropriate design to explain contexts with; this design aligns with 
the thesis research objective (Bryman, 2012, p. 401). Within the context of this research, it is 
inappropriate to portray refugees as mere numbers, as the aim is to see past the numbers and to 
dig deeper into the real issues refugees are facing. Moreover, it would be hard to generate 
understanding behind governmental choices for particular civil registration systems by using a 
quantitative design. Yet, where quantitative data strengthens and contributes to the qualitative 
data, it will be used.  
 
Although the cases in this research also host refugees from other countries, this research will 
only focus on Syrian refugees. Within the region, specific regulations have been tailor-made 
solely for the Syrian refugee population in order to deal with the scope of the influx, and/or as 
part of international agreements, such as the Jordan compact and the EU-Turkey deal, which 
will be elaborated on further upon in this thesis. In order to focus on these regulations, as well 
as to limit the research, it is decided that other refugee populations besides Syrians are excluded 
from the data analysis. Although Syrian refugees are not a homogenous group, due to the scope 
of the research, all persons that have fled from Syria to the neighboring countries will be 
considered Syrian refugees. A multiple case study design has been used with as cases Jordan, 
Turkey, and Lebanon. These cases have been decided upon based on a quantitative indicator: 
all cases have a large Syrian refugee population, as well as qualitative indicators, such as the 
composition of society, historical experience with refugee influxes, and political systems, 
which in all cases are different. The multiple case study will not solely be for the purpose of 
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comparison, but rather to provide contextual insight according to the qualitative research 
design (Bryman, 2012, p. 75). 
 
By conducting a literature-based desk-research, data will be collected by analyzing a wide 
variety of sources. Primary sources will be used to identify the main challenges Syrian refugees 
are dealing with, host countries’ governmental perspective on the refugee population within 
their borders, and the rights and entitlements of Syrian refugees. Primary sources will mainly 
provide firsthand views on issues and will include reports that contain interviews and 
statements with and by refugees, governmental documents, speeches and statements by both 
government officials and NGO staff. In addition, legal documents, such as the UDHR, the TPR, 
and several other human right treaties will be consulted. Secondly, a large number of secondary 
sources will be used, including (NGO) reports, newspapers, publications on websites of 
particular institutions, and textbooks. All sources will be selected based on quality, objectivity, 
and relevancy to answer the research questions.  
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3 Civil registration procedures 
 
3.1 Syrian refugee context 
The civil uprisings that suddenly erupted in the Middle East in 2011, often referred to as the 
Arab Spring, had in every country a different process and outcome. In Syria, the government’s 
crackdown on peaceful demonstrators caused the formation of the Free Syrian Army, which 
was the beginning of Syria’s slide into a full-scale civil war with international involvement. 
This conflict and the subsequent humanitarian crisis of epic proportion have caused the largest 
displacement crisis since World War II. Currently, eight years after the start of the Syrian 
conflict, more than half of the pre-war Syrian population has been forcibly displaced, internally 
and cross-border, rating Syrians the largest forcibly displaced population worldwide (Mercy 
Corps, 2018). Within Syria, more than six million people remain internally displaced, over a 
million Syrians have fled to Europe, and around five and a half million people have registered 
as refugees in the neighboring countries. The three countries that host the largest Syrian refugee 
populations are Jordan, which hosts 660.000 Syrians, Turkey, which hosts 3.4 million Syrians, 
and Lebanon, which hosts about a million Syrians (Connor, 2018) (Joint NGO Regional 
Report, 2018, p. 4). Within these three host countries, Syrian refugees often live under harsh 
conditions. Without proper civil documentation the vulnerability of these refugee increases, as 
they often cannot apply for legal residency, register civil events, enjoy certain rights, request 
humanitarian assistance, and access services such as healthcare, education, housing, and 
employment.  
 
Yet, the lack and loss of civil documentation among Syrian refugees in the host countries are 
of epic proportions. Surveys by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) show that around 70 
per cent of the Syrian refugees lack basic identity documents, while these are essential to apply 
for legal residency in the host countries and access services.2 Also family booklets, the civil 
document that registers all family members and proves both the parental identity and the 
marital status, are often lacking. These booklets, particularly with the absence of a national ID 
card and passport, are essential identity documents, which are required while registering civil 
events, such as births, marriages, and deaths. To state an example, during the eight years of 
living in exile, hundreds and thousands of children have been born from Syrian refugee parents. 
                                               
2 Basic identity documents have been defined in this particular research as not having a 
(valid) national ID card. 
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These babies have been born as refugees and will remain stateless if the link to a Syrian father 
cannot be proven. A birth certificate is the first step to secure Syrian nationality. Yet, 
completing birth registration procedures is often experienced as complex, as birth registration 
procedures in Syria are different. In 2017, 83 per cent of the Syrian refugee families in Lebanon 
were unable to register the birth of their child due to administrative and legal hurdles (VASYR, 
2017, p. 14). Moreover, half of the married Syrian refugees do not possess a marriage 
certificate, while this is a pre-requisite for obtaining birth certificates in both Jordan and 
Lebanon (NRC, 2017). In order to acquire civil documents, some families have taken drastic 
measures, such as using fake civil documents to be able to complete registration procedures, 
which are often expensive and is a serious crime, and returning to Syria to access registration 
procedures. According to UNHCR, lack and loss of civil documentation, and the subsequent 
risks many face of becoming stateless is a “ticking time-bomb.” (Clutterbuck, Cunial, Barsanti, 
& Gewis, 2018, p. 60). In the first period of refugee influx in the region, the host countries did 
not have structures to facilitate the procedures well. Governments thought that the conflict in 
Syria would end quickly and that the refugees would return home soon after. However, as the 
conflict and the subsequent refugee crisis became protracted, governments had to change their 
perspectives, which did not necessarily mean adaption of civil registration procedures. 
Although some host governments have been taking mitigating measures to decrease the lack 
of civil documentation, the problem is still widespread, affecting the present and future lives 
of many Syrians. 
 
3.2 Civil documents in Syria 
For Syrian refugees in exile, it is key that via civil documentation the link to Syria and the 
Syrian nationality is secured. Article 3 of the Syrian Nationality Law underlines that persons 
born to Syrian fathers inside and outside of Syria will automatically be considered a Syrian 
citizen. The law is based on paternal jus sanguinis. Persons born to a Syrian mother will not 
automatically obtain Syrian nationality. Syrian women could only grant Syrian nationality to 
their children if the paternal lineage of the child is unknown and only when the child is born 
inside Syria (Article 3(B), 1969). Consequently, most children born to Syrian parents in exile 
will not immediately face the risk of statelessness. However, particularly in this context in 
which families have been separated and people have been displaced and disappeared on large-
scale, the inability of Syrian women in exile to transmit the Syrian nationality to their children 
in absence of the father causes increased difficulty for these children to prove their entitlement 
to Syrian nationality. Due to the conflict, one in four refugee households lack a father to transfer 
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the Syrian nationality, they are female-headed households (UNHCR, 2016, p. 10). Also, 
children born in exile to Syrian women who are unable to prove their marriage to a Syrian man, 
or whose whereabouts are unknown, have no evidence to prove their link to a Syrian father 
(Albarazi & van Waas, 2016, p. 19) (UNHCR, 2016). 
 
In Syria, all persons aged 14 and above can obtain a national ID card, a hawiya. In addition, 
family booklets, deftar ha’ila, could be obtained and updated in Syria or at a Syrian diplomatic 
mission in a third country. Newly married couples need to obtain their own family booklet by 
showing their marriage certificate. Although many refugees have lost their civil documents due 
to the crisis, it is crucial to acknowledge the shortcoming of the Syrian civil registration system 
pre-crisis. Civil registries have never digitalized their hard-copy records and Syrian national 
and local customs have always had a large influence on civil registration procedures. According 
to Syrian customs, for instance, a ketb al-ktab, the unregistered Islamic marriage contract, is 
often deemed sufficient without (or at a later stage) registering the marriage officially with the 
authorities (Albarazi & van Waas, 2016, p. 19). Due to the conflict in Syria, many civil registry 
offices have been closed or destroyed, information covered in hard-copy records are 
permanently lost, and proof of new civil events, birth, marriages, divorces, and deaths have 
largely not been recorded. For Syrians that have fled to the neighboring countries, these issues 
could not only endanger their link to Syrian nationality upon return, but could also provide a 
source for challenges in obtaining civil documentation on the long run (Clutterbuck et al., 2018, 
p. 69). 
 
3.3 Challenges in obtaining civil documentation
  
Although civil registration provides the basis for individual legal identity, many barriers 
prevent people from registering life events. Particularly, Syrian refugees face more challenges, 
due to the protracted displacement, that contributes to under-registration of civil events. 
 
3.3.1 A lack of essential documents  
To access civil registration procedures, host countries require certain documents to be handed 
in, starting with identity documents, which refugees often do not possess. This lack of required 
civil documents is a significant barrier to completing civil registration procedures. As part of 
their strategy to push away refugees, some governments deliberately implement registration 
procedures with difficult requirements. In Lebanon, for instance, only 26 per cent of the Syrians 
above the age of 15 have legal residency, often due to high fees, while this proof of residency 
is essential to register any other form of civil events, as well as accessing services (VASyR, 
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2017, p. 13). Similar problems occur when a birth notification, which is provided by an 
authorized medical facility after giving birth, is lacking. In some cases, women have given 
birth in (private) hospital where they are not entitled to free healthcare and are unable to pay a 
high medical fee. In other cases, children are born outside of a hospital with the help of 
unauthorized midwives. However, this birth notification needs to be submitted in order to 
obtain a birth certificate. The lack of marriage certificates is also a major obstacle, as it also is 
a required document while registering births, at least in Jordan and Lebanon. Yet, over half of 
the married Syrians in exile do not possess their marriage documentation (NRC, 2017). As 
briefly mentioned previously, non-state actors in Syria have been issuing civil documents in 
non-governmental held areas. Host countries are finding themselves in difficult positions as 
the legal value and validity of such documents are questionable. As a result, local authorities 
within the host countries have been inconsistent concerning the acceptance of, and of which 
non-state actor issued documents (Albarazi & van Waas, 2016, p. 30).  
 
3.3.2 Practicalities  
Although language is not a problem in Jordan and Lebanon, as both are Arabic-speaking 
countries similar to Syria, in Turkey, the difference in languages increases the difficulty of the 
civil registration procedures. The absence of Arabic speaking Turkish officials, especially at 
district offices, contributes to miscommunication between Turkish officials and Syrian 
refugees. Moreover, the “Turkification” of Arab names and the difference between the Turkish 
and the Arabic alphabet could have an effect on proving family links, especially to Syrian 
fathers (Albarazi & van Waas, 2016, p. 33). It is reported that Khaled has been translated into 
Halit, while Marwa is turned into Merve etc (Horoz, 2018).  
 
In certain host countries, the issuance of civil documents is subjected to fees. For some refugee 
families, the financial burden that comes with civil registration is too high. In Jordan, costs for 
marriage certificates are ranging between 25 and 110 Jordanian Dinars (JOD). Moreover, 
refugees that are lacking required documents for civil registration could find themselves in 
situations where they are required to pay prohibitive costs. This could, for instance, be the case 
when there is no proof of marriage, yet parents aim to obtain a “recognition document”, or 
when a child is not registered within the legal time limit. For some Syrian families with 
vulnerable financial positions, especially female-headed households and households without a 
legal right to work, the financial burden of paying for transportation to go to a registration 
 16 
office could even be too much, especially when the distance to the offices is large (Albarazi & 
van Waas, 2016, pp. 32-33).  
 
3.3.3 Knowledge gap 
Research points out that Syrian refugees understand the importance of civil documentation but 
lack the awareness of civil registration procedures in the host countries. Syrian refugees are 
often unsure where to register, what steps to take, and/or what the required documents are. This 
confusion is increased by inconsistency regarding the required documents for civil registration 
by different governmental entities at different locations. As the procedures are often governed 
at the local level, this may vary depending on time and place. Due to the lack of knowledge of 
procedures in host countries, Syrian refugees have continued to stick to Syrian practices instead 
of adapting to new procedures. However, in the host countries, these practices are mostly not 
accepted as valid registration, thereby increasing the vulnerability of Syrian refugees. A good 
example is the previously mentioned ketb al-ktab, the Islamic marriage issued by a local sheikh. 
Within the host countries, such unregistered marriages are deemed informal and need to be 
registered officially in order to be recognized by authorities and used as proof in civil 
registration procedures. Yet, Syrian refugees have continued the ketb al-ktab tradition, under 
the assumption that Arab countries have the same customs. (I)NGOs in cooperation with 
governments have taken steps on increasing awareness under Syrian refugees, while 
governments have eased procedures as will become clear in the following chapters (Albarazi 
& van Waas, 2016, pp. 29-32).  
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4 Jordan   
While the Arab Spring spread over the Middle East, Jordan experienced some protests, but 
remained relatively stable after reforms were made. Situated along the southern border of Syria, 
Jordan became a safe haven for many Syrian refugees. As of September 2018, 670,429 Syrians 
have registered with UNHCR as refugees. Jordan has a long-standing history taking in 
refugees; more than two million registered Palestinian refugees live in Jordan, the vast majority 
has been granted full Jordanian citizenship (UNRWA, 2016). Moreover, apart from the 
Palestinian and Syrian refugees, multiple other refugee populations, including Iraqis, Yemenis, 
and Sudanese are residing in the country. While the resource-poor Kingdom has been dealing 
with a strained economy well before the influx of Syrian refugees, the large number of refugees 
has impacted the country significantly, increasing national debt in relation to the gross domestic 
product (GDP) to almost 96 per cent in 2018 (Statista, 2018). Consequently, public discontent 
and subsequently potential political instability caused the Jordanian government to adapt their 
refugee response plan by narrowing its hospitality towards Syrian refugees. However, due to 
Jordan’s experience with previous refugee influxes, the Amman-government understands that 
cooperation with the international community could provide opportunities for the development 
of the Kingdom as well, which has impacted civil registration procedures positively.  
 
4.1 Strengthening Syrians and Jordanians alike  
Around 80 per cent of the registered Syrian refugees live outside the refugee camps, 
predominantly in the Amman governorate, as well in the two northern governorates Mafraq 
and Irbid, which are also home to the most vulnerable Jordanian communities (UNHCR, 
2018C). Prior to the influx, Jordan already struggled with structural challenges such as poverty, 
overburdened infrastructure, unemployment, water scarcity, and high pressure on social 
services. Yet, the impact of the refugee influx on these host communities have been significant, 
as food and rent prices jumped, job competition further increased, infrastructure further 
crumbled, and governmental service delivery stained, particularly education, healthcare, and 
waste management. Although the government often suppressed the call for political chance by 
reminding Jordanians of the potential consequences of revolution by referring to the situation 
in Syria, the refugee influx “revealed long-present and deepening fissures in Jordan’s political, 
economic, and social infrastructure” (Francis, 2015, p. 3). As a result, marginalized Jordanians 
increasingly expressed their public frustrations, pushing the government to alter its refugee 
response. By mid-2013, border restrictions became tighter: some border crossings closed, the 
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number of Syrians that could enter restricted, and more refugees were placed in the camps. 
Since 2014, Jordan’s hospitality toward Syrian further worsened, as protection efforts 
decreased. However, the Jordanian Kingdom has always been a country that opened its borders 
to refugee populations and is therefore accustomed to negotiating opportunities with the 
international community. “Unsurprisingly, Jordan has demonstrated the most sophisticated 
regional response to the Syrian refugee crisis of all the major neighboring host countries … 
joining refugee and development responses in one comprehensive national plan” (Francis, 
2015, p. 5). By streamlining foreign aid for both vulnerable Jordanians and Syrians, the 
government has not only has attempted to capitalize on international support, it also aimed to 
strengthen its legitimacy by pleasing the Jordanian population while still responding to Syrian 
refugees’ needs. Furthermore, Jordan’s use of its role in the refugee response to leverage for 
international support and opportunities for nation building, demonstrates that the government 
understands the relationship between refugee influx and potential foreign aid. The Jordanian 
royal family, in particular, Queen Rania who was born to Palestinian parents, has an important 
role in pleading for refugees and support for host countries with the international community, 
thereby improving the country’s image (Francis, 2015, p. 5).  
 
4.2 Access to civil documentation 
Upon arrival, all refugees are officially required to report their arrival at one of Jordan’s refugee 
camps, which are co-managed by UNHCR and the government. Within the camps, all refugees 
obtain a ‘Proof of Registration’ document from UNHCR. After receiving approval to move out 
of the camp, eligible Syrian refugees are given ‘Asylum Seeker Certificates’ (ASC) per 
individual or family, which enables refugees to access assistance and services by UNHCR and 
other humanitarian agencies (IHRC & NRC, 2016, p. 8). Yet, to obtain documentation in 
Jordan, civil documents from Syria are required, which in some cases were confiscated at the 
border or are not in the possession of the refugee. Before 2013, the Jordanian authorities 
predominantly retained identity documents, such as passports and ID cards. However, at the 
height of the refugee influx in 2013, other civil documents, such as family booklets and 
marriage certificates, were also retained. When this practice ended in early 2014, the  Jordanian 
authorities had confiscated some 219,000 documents (IHRC & NRC, 2016, p. 14). Moreover, 
obtaining other civil documentation is significantly more complicated when certain civil 
documents, either from Syria or essential documents in Jordan, are missing, as further 
explained in this chapter (Townzen, 2016).  
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4.2.1 MoI card 
Upon arrival in Jordan, Syrians must also register with the Jordanian Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
to obtain a MoI Service Card (MoI card). This card “serves as proof of legal residency in a host 
community in a specific district” and is “used for accessing public services including health 
and educational services within the district in which the card was issued” (IHRC & NRC, 2016, 
p. 8). Additionally, it allows refugees to travel freely in Jordan, obtain a drivers’ license, and 
to apply for a work permit. The government restricts NGOs that are financed with foreign 
money to only assist refugees with a card (IHRC & NRC, 2016, p. 29). In July 2014, the process 
of obtaining and/or renewing the MoI card became increasingly complex, as a decision by the 
MoI restricted Syrians without an official ‘bail-out’ document from obtaining a MoI card. As 
all refugees must have been registered in a camp, refugees are solely allowed to relocate to host 
communities upon receiving a bail-out document through the bail-out process, which requires 
Syrians to have a Jordanian sponsor who is a relative above the age of 35 and married. At the 
same time, the government restricted UNHCR from issuing ASCs to Syrians without bail-out 
document. Consequently, refugees who tried to obtain an ASC from UNHCR after 14 July 
without a bail-out failed to do so, making it impossible for these refugees to access 
humanitarian services. Moreover, these Syrians were not able to apply for a MoI card. 
However, the number of refugees that remain officially registered in the refugee camps, while 
having moved to the host communities without authorization is quite high. NRC estimated that 
as of September 2016, that 17,000 of the 55,000 Syrians that were officially registered as 
residents of Azraq refugee camp, have left without a ‘bail-out’ document (IHRC & NRC, 2016, 
p. 8). The consequences of the exclusion of Syrians without bail-out document to access 
registration procedures for other documentation purposes became even more severe after the 
government decided, in January 2015, to officially cancel the bail-out process, without lifting 
the restrictive bail-out decisions (IHRC & NRC, 2015, p. 12). 
 
The government’s aim to have more insight into the Syrian population living in its communities 
seems clear. On the one hand its policies aim to keep the Syrians within the camps, and on the 
other hand it aims to control their movement outside of the camps. In line with this agenda, the 
Jordanian government introduced a re-registration system to verify all Syrian nationals in early 
2015, refugees and non-refugees, residing in Jordan outside the camps, which is called the 
“Urban Verification Exercise” (UVE). In order to obtain new biometric MoI cards, all Syrians 
have been expected to report to the local police stations and go through the biometric scanning 
process. Before receiving the new MoI cards, the refugees must hand in a variety of civil 
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documents, starting with proof of identity. This could either be a Syrian passport or ID card for 
adults, a family booklet or passport for children born in Syria, or a birth certificate for children 
born in Jordan. As many Syrians travelled without these documents and the Jordanian 
authorities retained a lot of these civil document at the border, the requirement of civil 
documents caused some challenges. However, through the UVE, the government enabled 
refugees to retrieve the retained documents. As of August 2016, more than 80 per cent of the 
documents had been returned. In addition, proof of address and health certificates issued by an 
authorized health center are also required for all Syrians above the age of twelve. At the 
beginning of the UVE, only 12 health centers were permitted to issue the certificates, but later 
on, this number was increased to 30. Moreover, as many Syrians in Jordan live under harsh 
economic conditions, the price of a single health certificate of 30 JOD was too high for many 
households. As a result, the government reduced the price to five JOD, after which the demand 
suddenly increased. In addition, refugees that have entered Jordan after December 2013 are 
required to show an ASC, which is particularly difficult for Syrians that applied for an ASC 
after 2014, without proof of bail-out (IHRC & NRC, 2016, pp. 8-15). 
 
All refugees are eligible for a MoI card, however, due to these requirements, a large group is 
facing challenges trying to obtain a new MoI card, particularly the refugees without an ASC. 
Among the Syrians without ASC are affluent refugees that never reported their arrival in Jordan 
in a refugee camp and were living off their savings. As the crisis has become a protracted 
situation, savings have run low, causing increasing vulnerability of this group (Townzen, 
2016). In addition, refugees that left the refugee camps without bail-out after July 2014 are 
facing challenges trying to obtain a MoI card. This includes all refugees that have left the camp 
from January 2015 onwards, when the bail-out system was cancelled. Another major reason 
for not obtaining the MoI card is the financial barrier. Although the card itself is free, additional 
costs, which could include costs for transportation, the costs for the health certificate, the 
inability to work due to the long waiting times, and the costs for gathering all required 
documents, could be a significant amount for households (Swan, 2017, p. 13). Some refugees 
have reported that they were not aware of the process for obtaining the MoI card, while others 
have stated that the waiting times were long as the local police offices and health centers were 
overwhelmed with the task. Yet, the most significant reason for the inability to obtain the card 
was a lack of the required documents. The financial costs for Syrian refugees to obtain or renew 
a Syrian passport at the Syrian Embassy in Amman are often too high, reportedly between $ 
400 and $ 200. In addition, refugees often feel unsafe reaching out to the Syrian authorities. 
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Refugees that have left Syria before the age of 14 and turned 18 in Jordan are particularly 
facing many challenges trying to obtain the card. They often do not have a Syrian ID card or 
passport, while family booklets are not accepted as a proof of identity since they are considered 
adults. Additionally, the lack of birth certificates, family booklets, and retained documents are 
posing challenges on Syrian refugees in Jordan. For these complex cases, a committee was 
established by government agencies and UNHCR. However, refugees are often unaware of its 
existence and the process level is very low (IHRC & NRC, 2016, pp. 10-21). As of December 
2017, 403,332 Syrians, around 60 per cent of all Syrians registered as refugees in Jordan, 
successfully obtain a new MoI card. As the government acknowledged this low number, it 
eased requirement. At the beginning of March 2018, it launched a campaign allowing UNHCR 
to issue ASCs to Syrians that have entered Jordan through informal borders and/or have no 
bail-out. “As of April 30th, an estimated number of more than 32,000 individuals came forward 
for rectification and almost 14,349 Asylum Seeker Certificate were granted” (JIF, 2018). The 
campaign, which ran until 27 September 2018, ensured that refugees had the opportunity to 
obtain legal status. With a valid ASC, Syrians are allowed to obtain a MoI card, as well as 
having access to protection and assistance by humanitarian agencies (JIF, 2018).  
 
4.2.2 Marriage registration  
In order to marry in Jordan, both Syrian and Jordanian couples need to apply for a marriage 
certificate from one of the Shari’a courts. This contains a whole process that starts by providing 
proof of identity, which generally is done by showing the MoI card, or in absence of this card, 
by showing Syrian documents. The bride’s guardian, generally speaking her father, as well as 
two witnesses are also required to provide their identity documents. In addition, the couple has 
to proof that they are not carriers of the genetic disease Thalassemia, by providing a health 
certificate issued by the Ministry of Health. Like other non-Jordanian couples, it is impossible 
for Syrian couples to marry without the permission of the MoI. With the approval letter of the 
MoI, which needs to be acquired in Amman, the couple can sign the marriage contract in the 
presence of the witnesses and with approval of the guardian. Subsequently, the judge will 
provide the couple with a marriage certificate at a cost ranging from 25 JOD to 110 JOD. 
Couples that have married informally through a ketb al-ktab, either in Jordan or Syria, are also 
able to legalize their wedding through registration. Although these marriages are illegal in 
Jordan, by paying a 1000 JOD fine, couples can request a marriage ratification certificate from 
a Shari’a court. The process is similar to the formal marriage process, but the court could order 
additional requirements, such as demanding the presence of the witnesses and the sheikh who 
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were involved in the informal marriage ceremony. Another common practice in Syria are early 
marriages of persons before the age of 18. This practice continues to occur in Jordan. 
Particularly girls from female-headed households are often pushed to marry young due to poor 
living conditions. In Jordan, it is prohibited to marry before the age of 18, but with judicial 
approval, it could be allowed for persons between the ages of 15 and 18. However, commonly 
“child” marriages are arranged informally. It is possible for these cases to submit for the 
marriage ratification certificate, but only if the girl was between the ages of 15 and 18, and 
even then, it depends on the judge’s verdict. For married children below the age of 15 it is 
impossible to register the marriage. As a marriage certificate is required while registering a 
birth, children born in early marriages are often unregistered, risking becoming stateless (IHRC 
& NRC, 2015, pp. 19, 22).   
 
Although the process seems straightforward, a lot of refugees are experiencing challenges 
obtaining a marriage certificate. Among the biggest challenges are the costs. As 93 per cent of 
the refugees outside of the camps are living below the poverty line in Jordan, the expenses for 
the registration of the marriage are often perceived too high (JIF, 2018, p. 10). The court that 
conducts or ratifies the certificate depends on the bride’s location of residence listed on the 
MoI card. However, as refugees are often on the move to new places, depending on housing 
and job opportunities, travel expenses are in some cases significant. In other cases, the court 
fees are too high. Particularly, the 1000 JOD fine for informal marriages is a major hurdle for 
registration. As the Jordanian government recognizes this, several improvements have been 
made to ease the process. In 2013, the government decided that couples that married informally 
outside of Jordan could register their marriage in Jordan without paying the fine. In addition, 
between October and December 2014, and May and July 2015, the fine was waived for couples 
that have married informally in Jordan. Other challenges have been the lack of awareness of 
the importance of civil documentation and the procedures in Jordan, inconsistencies in court 
practices, and a lack of the required documents. Again, the persons without bail-out status 
experience most difficulty. Although a MoI card is not officially required, the MoI reportedly 
denied refugees’ requests for approval if they were lacking a MoI card. Moreover, these same 
persons are often afraid to travel out of fear of being arrested and/or deported (IHRC & NRC, 
2015, pp. 20-23).  
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4.2.3 Birth registration  
When giving birth in Jordan, authorized hospitals or midwives give the family a birth 
notification. This notification has to be handed in at the Civil Status Department within 30 
days. Besides proof of identity, a proof of marriage is required by the Civil Status Department, 
which can be either a marriage certificate, a marriage ratification certificate, or a family booklet 
from Syria. Once these documents have been approved, the parents receive the birth certificate. 
Previously, the fee for registering within 30 days was 1 JOD. However, after advocacy efforts, 
the fee has recently been lifted. If the parents fail to register their child within the time limit, a 
fine must be paid of 10 JOD. Birth registration, however, has to be done within a year. If more 
than a year has passed since the birth, the parents are required to go to a Magistrates Court for 
special permission. Children born in Syria, but having fled to Jordan before registering their 
birth, are not able to receive a birth certificate in Jordan. This, however, is the case for many 
children as due to the nature of conflict families have been unable to register their newborns. 
Recently, the government has allowed these children to receive a new MoI card if their names 
are mentioned in the families’ ASC (JIF, 2018, p. 11). Yet,  75 per cent of the Syrian households 
in Jordan have at least one child that does not have a birth certificate (Boncenne, Erba, John, 
& Khan, 2018, p. 100). By far the largest hurdle for completing birth registration is the lack of 
required documents, particularly the inability of parents to prove their marriage, often due to 
early marriages and the nature of displacement. Parents also lacked the birth notification as a 
result of giving birth at home, or the inability to pay high hospital fees. Particularly after 
February 2018, when the subsidized healthcare was canceled, refugees had to resort to not 
giving birth in medical facilities. In addition, the lack of awareness of the procedures for birth 
registration and the inconsistency of the Civil Status Department are also reasons for the lack 
of birth registration. Yet, birth registration is evident to establish an identity for these children  
and to safeguard them from becoming stateless (IHRC & NRC, 2016, pp. 22-24) 
 
4.3 Access to services  
Despite that Jordan is host of one of the largest refugee populations worldwide, it has not signed 
any international treaty on refugee rights, nor statelessness. Nevertheless, the kingdom does 
uphold customary international law by providing fairly good treatment for refugees within their 
borders. Since the beginning of the refugee influx, Jordan allows Syrian children free access to 
public education. However, as over half of the Syrian refugee population is below the age of 
18, this decision put a large pressure on the capacity of the education sector. Although prior to 
the influx, the government aimed to reduce double-shifted schools, the large number of Syrian 
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crisis has caused an increase of double-shifted schools (Francis, 2015, pp. 8-9). Moreover, 
refugee children had to provide identity documents and MoI cards in order to enroll in public 
schools (HRW, 2016). At the start of the 2016-2017 school year, the Ministry of Education 
announced that all children could access public education, regardless of their nationality and 
documentation status. This decision was extended during the following two school years (JIF, 
2018, pp. 8-9). As of January 2017, 72 per cent of the registered Syrian refugee children are 
enrolled in schools (UNICEF Jordan, 2017). 
 
At the beginning of the crisis, registered refugees with UNHCR could enjoy free healthcare. 
This changed in 2014, after the government decided that Syrians had to pay the non-insured 
Jordanian rate, which is about 35-60 per cent of what other non-Jordanians pay. However, this 
only applied to Syrians with a MoI card and ASC. Without these documents, Syrians had to 
pay the same rate as other non-Jordanians. After the earlier mentioned revoking of subsidized 
healthcare in January 2018, there is no longer a difference between documented and 
undocumented Syrian refugees. Moreover, 80 per cent of the medical costs have to be paid up 
front. Although pre- and post-natal care, family planning, and vaccinations were free due to a 
special 2016 decree by the Ministry of Health, since 2018, these services are not provided 
consistently in public health facilities. From the beginning of the refugee influx until the end 
of 2016, the Jordanian government stated that it already invested JOD 1,5 billion on healthcare 
for Syrians, a significant amount for a country in economic hardship (Human Rights Watch, 
2018).  
 
In February 2016, the Jordan Compact was signed. This trade-agreement between Jordan and 
the European Union (EU) focused on job creation for Syrian refugees and Jordanian host 
communities. It committed Jordan to issue 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees in a three-
year period, in exchange for eased rules rule of origin to improve Jordan’s access to the EU 
market. The work permits, however, are restricted to certain sectors only, such as agriculture 
and construction. In addition, refugees need to have a MoI card in order to obtain a work permit 
(JIF, 2018, p. 9). Within two years after signing the agreement, close to 90,000 work permits 
were issued, which includes the number of renewals. In addition to the disappointing results, 
more than 95 per cent of the work permits were granted to males (Ministry of Labour , 2018, 
p. 3).  
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4.4 Forced return to Syria  
Besides that Jordan is signaling that without additional financial help from donors, it is no 
longer able to assist Syrian refugees within its border to the extent as before, the government 
also strictly enforces MoI cards to have better security insight of who is present in the kingdom. 
The freedom of movement of refugees without official bail-out certificate, MoI card, ASC and 
sometimes work permits is increasingly restricted as they face involuntary relocation to the 
camps, predominantly Azraq refugee camp, after police checked their lacked documentation 
status through roadside check-up stations, workplace inspections, random checks, and 
sometimes even raids. A result of the relocation is family separation, the majority of times 
concerning the breadwinner of the households, as they are more exposed to police checks. In 
addition, Jordan has initiated deportation of Syrians back to Syria in 2017, going against the 
principles of non-refoulement. In total, 2,361 deportations, confirmed by UNHCR, have 
occurred (JIF, 2018, pp. 13-15).  
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5 Turkey  
Located at the northern border of Syria, Turkey has been a destination for many Syrians, 
particularly the ones fleeing from Aleppo. Due to the welcoming rhetoric of the Turkish 
government, the Syrian population grew fast during the first years of the influx. As of October 
2018, 3,577,752 Syrians have been registered with the Turkish government and UNHCR, in 
addition to almost 370,000 non-Syrian refugees, making Turkey host of the largest refugee 
population worldwide (UNHCR, 2018B). In the ten years before the refugee influx, Turkey 
was among the fastest growing economies in the world. This enabled Turkey to have an active 
role in managing the refugee influx by adopting a temporary protection regime, which includes 
refugee-sensitive civil registration systems and access to services for Syrian refugees. Due to 
Turkey’s geographical position close to Europe, the Turkish government has had a unique 
position to negotiate beneficial agreements. However, as the economic growth slowed down, 
the number of Syrian refugees reached its height, and the government increased its power, 
critical voices became louder. In 2016, a coup surprised Turkey, which turned Turkey in a state 
of emergency.  
 
5.1 From open-door policy to temporary protection 
Although Turkey is signatory to the 1951 Convention and the additional 1967 Protocol, it is 
one of the few countries that included geographical constrictions by granting the right to 
asylum only to Europeans, thereby excluding Syrians. When in 2011 the first Syrians entered 
Turkey, the government received them with open arms, referring to the Syrian refugees as 
“guests”. When the number of Syrians entering Turkey continued to increase and it became 
clear that the Syrians would not return to their homes anytime soon, Turkey ended this legal 
ambiguous status by adopting the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LIFP) in 
April 2013, which entered into force in April 2014. The LIFP grants ‘temporary protection’ for 
persons that have been forced to flee their country en masse and subsequently have crossed the 
Turkish border. Moreover, the LIFP introduced the General Directorate on Migration 
Management (GDMM), a newly established agency under the Ministry of the Interior with the 
mandate of centralizing asylum procedures. In October 2014, the government adopted 
additional legislation on the rights, obligations, and procedures regarding temporary protection 
with the Regulation on Temporary Protection (TPR) (Baban, Ilcan, & Rygiel, 2017, pp. 88-
89). 
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Until early 2013, almost all Syrians that had fled to Turkey were hosted in refugee camps which 
are located across southeastern Turkey along the border with Syria. Although living conditions 
in these camps have been described as relatively safe and comfortable compared to refugee 
camps in other host countries, Syrian refugees have relocated in high speed to urban settings, 
despite the significant worse living conditions. Main reasons for this shift have been the fact 
that Syrians who entered illegally were not eligible for registering at the camps and that the 
capacity of the camps became overburdened as the influx of Syrians increased and intensified. 
While by the end of 2014 55,000 Syrians were seeking refuge in Turkey monthly, the vast 
majority, 80 per cent of the Syrians were settled outside the camps (İçduygu, 2015, p. 8). 
Currently, 90 per cent of the Syrians live outside the camps (Ineli-Ciger, 2017, p. 576). 
Although the TPR is incorporating Syrians into the Turkish already extensive welfare system, 
it is failing to offer future prospect on full citizenship, leaving Syrians in an insecure and 
unstable situation. As in this period legislation regarding work permits lacked, many Syrians 
were facing economic hardships as they were forced to settle for low-paying work in the 
informal sector. At the same time, tensions in the host community increased, as the large 
number of Syrians put pressure on the delivery of services (Baban, Ilcan, & Rygiel, 2017, p. 
46). As the end of the conflict in Syria did not seem near and many Syrians felt challenged by 
the insecure situation in Turkey, an increasing number of Syrians risked their lives reaching 
Europe by crossing the sea.  
 
5.2 EU-Turkey Deal  
In 2014, 138,000 refugees arrived in Europe to seek international protection, while at the height 
of the movement in 2015, nearly 500,000 refugees had made their way to Europe. In March 
2016, the EU and Turkey agreed upon a non-binding document, the EU-Turkey deal, with the 
aim to stop the illegal flow of refugees coming to Europe. In essence, the deal states that for 
every Syrian refugee that will be returned from Greece to Turkey, another Syrian refugee will 
be resettled in the EU through legal ways. Turkey, in its turn, would need to prevent refugees 
from travelling to Europe from its shores. As part of the agreement Turkish citizens would be 
allowed to travel visa-free to the EU, the of accession talks of Turkey to the EU would be 
reopened, and more than three billion euros would be provided to support Turkey’s efforts 
regarding Syrians refugees in the first two years, with promises for an additional three billion 
in 2018 (Chen, 2018, p. 4). Yet, post-deal, the relationship between both parties have 
intensified as Turkey has complained about needing to meet too many conditions and that the 
EU is too slow with transferring the agreed upon amounts, while the EU has complained that 
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the capacity of Turkish state institutions is too weak to absorb the cash injection. However, 
both parties understand that cooperation is in their best interest. It is not the government, but 
EU’s Emergency Social Safety Net, flagship of the deal, that is responsible for most of the 
direct aid to registered Syrians in Turkey (International Crisis Group, 2018, pp. 2,14).  
 
5.3 Heightened political tension: the failed coup attempt 
Following a failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016, Turkey declared a state of emergency. Under 
this state of emergency, normal legislative procedures were replaced by legislation through 
presidential decrees. In October 2016, this resulted in amendments to the LFIP: All persons 
under temporary protection “who are suspected to be involved in terrorist or criminal 
organisations or who are deemed to pose a threat to public order, public safety or public health 
can be issued with an immediate removal decision” (Zoeteweij-Turhan, 2018, p. 56). In 
addition to the use of ambiguous and vague terms such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘threat to public 
safety’, the amendment gives Ankara free rein to put aside its obligation of non-refoulement 
under international law. Subsequently, in some cases, Syrians have been deported to Syria, 
particularly Syrian refugees that worked for INGOs have been the victim of ordered 
deportations. After the coup, (I)NGOs have been forced to operate in a heightened suspicious 
environment: many (I)NGOs have been investigated, staff have been arrested and/or had their 
official registration approval cancelled, or refused when trying to renew (Zoeteweij-Turhan, 
2018, p. 56). Besides the forced shut down of around 1500 (I)NGOs, the elimination of over 
100,000 civil servants for alleged links to ‘terrorist organisations’ has resulted in loss of 
capacity of governmental institutions that assist both Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees, 
particularly in the education and healthcare sectors (International Crisis Group, 2018, pp. 1, 
10).  
 
5.4 Political opportunism or morally obligated? 
During the past eight years of refugee influx, the approach of the Turkish government, or rather 
said, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) under President Erdoğan, has 
seemed beneficial, rather than a burden. The government has stated that Turkey’s approach 
towards the Syrians in Turkey to safe ‘human dignity’ is morally motivated. However, 
Turkey’s bargain with the EU, the EU-Turkey deal, which at the expense of Syrian refugees 
benefited Turkey with large amounts of money and other concessions, question this noble 
motivation (Gardner, 2016). Not only does Erdoğan emphasize Turkey’s generous open-door 
policy in contrast to the EU’s reluctance to take in refugees as a means to strengthen its position 
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and improve Turkey’s image. Erdoğan likewise compares the ‘embarrassing’ small amount of 
financial aid by ‘western institutions’, such as the UN, to the ‘enormous’ investment Turkey 
has made over the years. Through the naming and shaming of western actors, the support for 
the government by the Turks has increased (Hintz & Feehan, 2017). The political opposition 
has long feared that the AKP would use the refugee response to render political support from 
naturalized Syrians. When in June 2016 Erdoğan announced a plan to grant Syrians citizenship, 
societal backlash, which included hostility towards Syrian refugees, forced the government to 
take a more moderate stance. As a result, the plan was altered by stating that solely highly 
skilled and educated Syrians would receive citizenship (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 7). 
This illustrates that the government uses citizenship as political leverage, rather than realistic 
positive pathways for refugee integration (Baban, Ilcan , & Rygiel, 2017, p. 88). Despite the 
welcoming rhetoric used by the government, Syrian refugees’ integration into the Turkish 
society has not been far-reaching, as this chapter demonstrates (Hintz & Feehan, 2017). 
 
5.5 Access to civil documentation  
5.5.1 Legal status 
Under Turkey’s ‘open-border’ policy, Syrians refugees, regardless of their religious, ethnic, 
political, or cultural differences have been allowed to enter Turkey. Until early 2014, all Syrian 
nationals, including those without identification documents and stateless persons from Syria, 
were able to enter through at least six border crossings along the entire border. Yet, from 2015 
onwards, a hardening of border restrictions made admission in Turkey more complicated. By 
March, the number of open land borders had been reduced to two, which only admitted Syrians 
with emergency needs or for family reunification (Universalia, 2016, p. 42). Consequently, 
Syrian refugees have attempted to cross into Turkey through smuggling routes. Increased 
hostility by Turkish border guards has been the answer to this development, which led to the 
death of over 330 refugees by November 2017 (HRW, 2018A). UNHCR’s role in Turkey has 
been limited to providing assistance to the registration procedures, as the government’s 
ownership of the refugee crisis management has been strong, also concerning refugee 
registration. When the first Syrians arrived in Turkey in April and May 2011, UNHCR 
registered them according to the RSD. However, the Disaster and Emergency Management 
Presidency (AFAD) took over registration not long thereafter, issuing ID cards for refugees 
within the camps. By 2014, the GDMM was established, which took over the registration 
management (Universalia, 2016, pp. 34-36). As the status of Syrian refugees is legally adopted 
under the banner of the temporary protection regime, all Syrian nationals, including those 
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without identification documents and stateless persons from Syria are allowed to be registered 
(Yıldız & Uzgören, 2016, pp. 3-4).  
 
Upon arrival in Turkey, Syrians are required to register with the local office of the GDMM, 
the Provincial Directorates of Migration Management (PDMM), to receive the temporary 
protection status. For Syrians without identity documents Turkey has implemented the option 
to provide the information orally. The registration procedure is initiated by obtaining a pre-
registration paper for an initial security check. In addition, information on the continuation of 
the registration procedure is given, while a date is set for an interview to determine the 
applicant’s status. During this phase, applicants are required to live in a designated satellite 
city, which upon receiving temporary protection can be left. Within six months, the applicant 
will receive a temporary protection identity card, a kimlik, free of charge with a validity period 
of three years (Law Library of Congress, 2016). Refugees that have entered Turkey irregularly 
are also eligible to the temporary protection status. During the initial stages after the 
government took over registration management from UNHCR, registration procedures were 
chaotic and consistently changing. “Different government officials and agencies applied 
different registration processes and requested different documentation” (Baban, Ilcan , & 
Rygiel, 2017, p. 91). For Syrian refugees, who often already struggled with the language barrier 
during the first period in Turkey, this inconsistency increased the complexity of the registration 
procedure. In addition, the kimliks have been changed several times. In 2016, an obligatory 
largescale verification mission led to delays in registration and subsequent inaccessibility of 
social services (Baban, Ilcan, & Rygiel, 2017, pp. 92-93). As the temporary protection regime 
is developed as an emergency response, it does not guarantee any right to citizenship. Although 
the kimlik is not the same as a residence permit, it does allow Syrian refugees to stay legally 
and move freely in Turkey, and have access to rights and services (UNHCR, 2017, pp. 6-7). 
However, actual access to services is dependent on governmental goodwill. Political instability 
or governmental change could affect these entitlements and place refugees in a vulnerable 
position (Yıldız & Uzgören, 2016, p. 5).  
 
As of mid-2018, more than 700,000 refugees are in possession of Turkish residence permits. 
From a security perspective, the large number of newcomers on Turkish territory increased the 
government’s will to know who exactly is present in Turkey. As of January 2015, Syrians are 
obligated to either file for residency or register for temporary protection status within 90 days 
after arrival. Previous to this date, Syrians that overstayed the 90-day limit were able to cross 
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into Syria, thereby renewing this period. However, because of the new enforcement, Syrians 
that overstayed the 90-day limit can be fined up to $250 (Norman, 2016). Yet, obtaining a 
residence permit is not an easy task for Syrian refugees, as a valid passport (which the majority 
of the Syrians in Turkey do not have), a bank account with at least $6,000, and a Turkish health 
insurance, which yearly costs $300, are required (Cagaptay & Yalkin, 2018). Registration for 
the temporary protection status is relatively easy, however, some Syrians never registered for 
temporary protection as they remained hopeful of traveling to Europe and feared that 
registration would jeopardize this chance. Since 2011, more than 55,000 Syrians have been 
granted citizenship. Although the opposition and parts of Turkish society are against the plan, 
the government has promised to naturalize an additional 300,000 Syrians in the years to come 
(al-Jablawi, 2018). 
 
5.5.2 Marriage registration 
According to Turkish law, all refugees above the age of eighteen are allowed to marry. Yet, 
many Syrians failed to register their marriages due to difficult civil documentation 
requirements before the initiation of the TPR. A lack of procedures regarding lost documents, 
the absence of the right documents, and documents issues by non-state actors contribute to the 
hardships experienced by Syrians trying to obtain registration. According to a 2014 AFAD 
report, around five per cent of Syrians inside the camps and around 27 per cent of those living 
outside the camps crossed the Turkish border with their own passports (AFAD, 2014, p. 48). 
While many Syrians have been unable to travel to Syria to secure documentation, the Syrian 
embassy in Ankara has had limited capacity, requires money, and is not as accessible for 
Syrians who are considered part of the opposition (Arij, 2016). Under the TPR, registering 
marriage is relatively easier, as the temporary protection kimlik can be used as an identity 
document. A medical report confirming the absence of genetic diseases, four photocopies, a 
signed petition of marriage, and a document proving that the applicant is not already married 
are also required. The latter document is a hurdle for many Syrians that have travelled to Turkey 
without documents and are left with nothing to prove their marital status. Consequently, many 
Syrians are facing challenges in completing the marriage registration procedure. For the 
couples that successfully complete the registration procedures and receive a marriage 
certificate, it is required to notify the marriage at the PDMM (UNHCR, n.d.).  
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5.5.3 Birth registration  
The Turkish Parliament’s Refugee Subcommittee stated in March 2018 that more than 310,000 
babies of Syrian origin have been born in Turkey since 2011 (Sarıoğlu, 2018). Upon giving 
birth, which the majority of times is done in a Turkish hospital, the mother is provided with a 
birth report. Within 30 days, the birth should be notified at the local Population and Civil 
Registry Department free of registration fees. Required documents are the birth report and ID 
documents from the parents. Before the introduction of the TPR, many Syrians were unable to 
finish this step, as they often fled to Turkey without their civil documents. Shortly after the 
introduction of the TPR, the number of successful birth registrations did not increase, as the 
registration system for the kimlik was overwhelmed for quite some time by the enormous 
demand, leaving a lot of Syrians without any identity documents. A marriage certificate is not 
requested, but if the father is absent and the mother does not have a marriage certificate nor a 
birth certificate of the father, the father’s name will not be mentioned on the child’s birth 
certificate. This is problematic for the future of the child, as this prevents a child from proving 
a rightful claim on Syrian nationality through the paternal line. Without the right civil 
documentation, like a family booklet or a marriage certificate, particularly children born from 
pregnant women that arrived in Turkey without a husband, are left in limbo. At the local 
Population and Civil Registry Department, the child will be issued a kimlik, which provides 
legal status in Turkey. In addition, the birth should be reported to the PDMM in order to receive 
the temporary protection status and subsequent access to services. Although the process for 
birth registration is relatively easy in Turkey compared to Jordan or Lebanon, lack of awareness 
among Syrians results in a lack of birth registrations. Also, the language barrier poses 
challenges on the awareness of procedures. There are no Arabic speaking officials working at 
the local Population and Civil Registry. Babies born from illegal marriages, such as child 
marriages, religious marriages, or second marriages are also likely not to be registered as the 
parents could be prosecuted upon approaching the authorities (Reynolds & Grisgraber, 2015, 
pp. 7-11).  
 
5.6 Access to services  
With the adoption of the TPR in 2014, the level of protection for Syrian refugees improved as 
it became clear what rights and entitlement were granted. Prior to the adoption, the absence of 
legislation left many Syrians in vulnerable positions. Nevertheless, the right to education for 
all children regardless of their nationality or status is secured in Article 42 of the Turkish 
Constitution, making education accessible to Syrians since the beginning of their arrival. 
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Likewise, this right is granted to Syrians under the TPR, stating that persons with temporary 
protection status are entitled to access preschool, language education, vocational training, and 
primary, secondary, and higher education. Yet, although the enrollment rate is slowly 
increasing, it has been challenging to keep Syrian children in the free public schools. Many 
children are dealing with a language barrier as their knowledge of Turkish is limited (Ineli-
Ciger, 2017, pp. 559-560). In temporary education centers, introduced by the Ministry of 
Education, almost 40 per cent of the school-going Syrian children are receiving a modified 
Syrian curriculum in Arabic with Turkish language classes. For the first time in 2017 this 
number has been lower than the enrollment in public schools, reflecting the government’s 
efforts to gradually integrate these children into the national education system. Nevertheless, 
more than 350,000 children, 38 per cent of the Syrian children, remain out of school (UNICEF, 
2017, p. 23). The main reasons why children remain out of school are the need to support their 
families by working, the requirement to be registered with the Turkish authorities, the language 
barrier, and the lack of capacity to accommodate all Syrian children. In an attempt to increase 
the enrollment number, conditional cash-based assistance is provided to vulnerable families. 
Moreover, as a result of a governmental decision to waive the tuition fees for Syrian students 
attending state universities, almost 15,000 Syrians were pursuing a university degree as of 
February 2017 (Ineli-Ciger, 2017, p. 560). 
 
Under the TPR, Syrians with temporary protection status have access to free basic healthcare. 
Within state hospitals, registered Syrians are able to receive free medical treatment for primary 
and emergency health services. Accessing medical services at a private hospital is not possible 
for registered Syrians, except in emergency situations or with a referral from another health 
facility. In several provinces with high numbers of Syrians, registered Syrians can access 
medical care provided at Migrant Health Centers, which employ Arabic-speaking staff, often 
Syrian refugees themselves (UNHCR, 2017, p. 29).  However, although access to healthcare is 
free, a lot of Syrians are facing challenges obtaining the right treatment due to the high cost of 
medicines, which are not free (Yıldız & Uzgören, 2016, p. 11). 
 
In January 2016, the Turkish Council of Ministers adopted the Regulation Concerning Work 
Permits of Temporary Protection Beneficiaries, giving registered Syrians the right to apply for 
work permits. Prior to this Regulation, Syrians worked without social protection in the informal 
economy, vulnerable to exploitation and low wages, if they received payment at all. Although 
the adoption of the Regulation was a step forward, in reality, the procedure for applying for the 
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work permit is complicated, resulting in a low number of actual issued permits. Issued work 
permits only allow the registered person to work in the area registered on the kimlik, certain 
jobs are not available for Syrians, and workplaces are conditioned by quotas: the number of 
Syrians is limited to ten per cent of the total workforce, while only one Syrian is allowed to 
work at a place with less than ten employees (Ineli-Ciger, 2017, p. 561). Moreover, the 
employers are required to apply for the work permit on behalf of their Syrian employees. 
However, the regulations regarding the work permit are discouraging, as the police does not 
investigate workplaces for illegal workers and legally employing Syrians costs a lot of money. 
Employers are obligated to pay the minimum wage of TRY 1,800, pay social security 
contributions, and pay a work permit fee of TRY 229, which prior to 2018 cost TRY 615 
(Leghtas & Hollingsworth, 2017, p. 11). As of March 2018, just over 40,000 Syrians were in 
the possession of a work permit, 19,925 Syrians with temporary protection status and 20,970 
Syrians with a residence permit. As governmental statistics suggest that the number of 
working-age Syrians is over two million, the number of issued work permits forces 98 per cent 
of the Syrians to work outside of the formal labour market. With 59 per cent of the Syrian 
households classified as multi-dimensionally poor, deprived of multiple factors that determine 
poverty, the lack of legal work contributes to the increasing vulnerability of the Syrians. Many 
Syrians, however, are happy with any job as the high unemployment rate and the subsequent 
competition is hindering many households from having a stable income (Revel, 2018) (Ineli-
Ciger, 2017, p. 563). 
 
5.7 Creating conditions for return   
Despite Turkey’s politically polarized setting, the host country is remarkably united in their 
increasing negative stance towards refugees. According to research by the Bilgi University, 
two thirds of the respondents, including almost half of the AKP-voters, stated that the 
government’s policies towards Syrians are wrong (Jones, 2018). In addition, violent incidents 
between Syrians and Turks increased “threefold in the second half of 2017 compared to the 
same period in 2016” (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 1). Although Turkish society has 
welcomed Syrians with solidarity, the pressure of integrating the enormous influx has had a 
major impact on the country. Over $30 billion has been invested by the government in the 
accommodation of refugees, burdening Turkey’s economic abilities (Jones, 2018). Under the 
banner of clearing the Syrian side along Turkish border from terrorists, Turkey has initiated 
the discussion on return to Syria, stating that it will facilitate return as good as possible by 
rebuilding infrastructure and facilities. After Operation Euphrates Shield concluded in March 
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2017, Turkey rebuilt the regions’ infrastructure, particularly schools, health facilities, and 
mosques, after which almost 140,000 Syrians returned to the regions of Jarabulus, Azaz, and 
Al-Bab. The Turkish government did the same after the liberation of Afrin as part of Operation 
Olive Branch last March. Already before the operation, First Lady Emine Erdoğan stated that 
as many as 500,000 Syrians could return to Afrin. While the Turkish government established 
improved conditions for return of Syrians, it does not force Syrians under temporary protection 
status to return (Marks, 2018).  
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6 Lebanon  
For Syrians from areas along the border with Lebanon, such as the areas around the cities of 
Damascus and Homs, Lebanon became the main destination to escape the conflict. As of 
September 2018, 976,002 Syrians have been registered as refugees with UNHCR in Lebanon, 
which as a result hosts the highest per capita population of refugees in the world (UNHCR, 
2018A). It is estimated that the country also hosts between the 300,000 and 500,000 
unregistered Syrian refugees, as well as an estimated 45,000 Palestine refugees from Syria 
(Janmyr, 2016, p. 6). After the 1975-1990 civil war, Lebanon’s economy was significantly 
damaged. Although between 2007 and 2010 record growth levels were reached due to post-
war reconstruction programmes, the conflict in Syria slowed down this economic growth. 
Moreover, Lebanon’s political arena has been characterized by political immobility. 
Consequently, by the end of 2017, the public debt reached above 150 per cent of the Lebanese 
GDP (Export-Enterprises.com, 2018). When in 2014 a power-sharing government was formed,  
civil registration procedures were deliberately made difficult to keep Syrians from staying 
long-term or permanent. For the Lebanese government, safeguarding political and ethnical 
stability has been a major reason for deterring Syrians to come to, or to stay in Lebanon. 
Moreover, having negatively experienced the Palestinian refugee influx in the past, the 
Lebanese government have been determined to not make similar mistakes 
 
6.1 Political immobility  
At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the borders were open and a national response by the 
Lebanese government lacked. Merely two policies were adopted in 2012 to protect Lebanon 
from possible negative future effects of the crisis: the dissociation policy, which announced 
Lebanon’s neutral position towards the Syrian conflict, and the non-encampment policy, to 
prevent the formation of official refugee camps. Besides which, the government perceived the 
refugee influx as a temporary issue, it is crucial to understand the lack of a national response 
in the light of the complex political system. In Lebanon, power is shared in a grand coalition 
government based on sectarian division: a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister, and a 
Shi’i leader in the legislature. In addition, sectarian-based quotas have preserved both the 
cabinet and the parliament from predominance of a particular group. Within this complex web, 
elites have often been at the center of decision making by bargaining and closing informal 
deals. Consequently, increased elite discords have often led to political immobility in times of 
crisis. This has also been the case in the first five years after the beginning of the Arab 
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uprisings, as two power-sharing cabinets collapsed, and Lebanon experienced a presidential 
vacuum for more than two years. This political stand-off ended in October 2016, when the 
parliament agreed upon a deal for Michel Aoun, Maronite leader of the Free Patriotic 
Movement, to become president, if Saad Hariri, Sunni Future Movement’s leader, would 
become prime minister (Fakhoury, 2017, p. 682).  
 
6.2 Nation against refugees 
Following ten months of negotiations, Sunni Prime Minister Tamam Salam finally formed a 
power-sharing government in February 2014, which held until December 2016. This 
government realized that the Syrian crisis would not end soon and that the refugee influx would 
be a long-term issue. Having experienced a similar situation with the Palestinian refugee-case, 
the government feared a similar outcome if the open-door policy continued. Currently, some 
450,000 Palestinian refugees are permanently settled in Lebanon, as they never left the 
Lebanese refugee camps (Atallah & Mahdi, 2017, pp. 22-26). Moreover, the dominant 
perspective of the Lebanese population on Syrian refugees is negative, as they are often 
portrayed as a burden on the economy, infrastructure, and services. With the division of power 
along sectarian lines, Lebanese Christians and increasingly Shia Muslims have feared the 
influx of predominantly Sunni Syrians and the subsequent shift in the demographic balance 
between the groups. The Lebanese Sunni community approached the Syrians at first with 
solidarity, as many are linked by family and tribal ties across the border areas. However, since 
2013, this stance altered gradually, resulting in tighter governmental policy, which has also 
been advocated for by Sunni politicians. The strategic value of the Sunni Syrians and the 
subsequent Lebanese Sunni support decreased as the security risks increased. In 2013, conflict 
between Alawites and Sunnis spilled over to the northern town of Tripoli and Beirut, in the 
same year, Hezbollah, part of a Lebanese Shia political party, admitted its involvement in the 
Syrian crisis; and the increasing clashes of Islamist fighters with the Lebanese army and several 
bomb attacks on Lebanese soil were clear indicators that it was hard to keep the spillover of 
the Syrian conflict out of Lebanon (Hägerdal, 2018, p. 5). Consequently, Tammam Salam’s 
government installed a crisis cell to deal with the humanitarian crisis and new policies were 
adopted. Besides increasingly restrictive border policy, that has been aimed at limiting and 
decreasing the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, other restrictive policies concerning civil 
registration and access to the labor market have been adopted. Although a formal national 
response has been lacking, it is perceived that the governmental strategy is aimed at deterring 
Syrians from residing permanently in Lebanon by making administrative procedures difficult 
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and discriminatory. Subsequently, governmental policies are aimed to facilitate return, rather 
than to formalize the presence and status of Syrian refugees (Atallah & Mahdi, 2017, pp. 22-
26).  
 
As Lebanon is not a party member to any of the refugee treaties, the Lebanese government has 
refrained from calling Syrians ‘refugees’, in order to not acknowledge them as such. Rather, 
vague terms like ‘displaced’ and ‘de facto refugee’ have been used to refer to Syrian refugees.  
The Lebanese government has been reluctant to directly engage with the refugee presence, out 
of fear for creating political and ethnical instability and giving the incentive for permanent 
settlement within the borders. Given that Lebanon itself is still recovering from years of 
conflict within their own borders, public services and infrastructure were already strained pre-
influx of Syrian refugees. Due to the general unwillingness of the government to manage the 
refugee response, (I)NGOs and local municipalities have been allowed to relatively act in a 
relatively autonomous way. Yet, their capacity to do so depends on almost entirely on the 
support of donors (Dionigi, 2016, pp. 25-30). Lebanon has understood the benefits that stem 
from its position in hosting Syrian refugees, however the lack of political consensus sometimes 
resulted in the failure to safeguard donor assistance, as was the case when the World Bank 
wanted to establish a trust fund that would have benefit both Syrians and vulnerable Lebanese 
communities (O'Driscoll, p. 2). While donor fatigue is responsible for decreasing international 
support, the call for return of refugees to Syria is increasingly louder (HRW, 2018B, p. 15). 
Hosting Syrian refugees in the country has placed enormous pressure on Lebanon’s financial 
health. As Prime Minister Saad Hariri stated at the 2017 Brussels Conference "Supporting the 
Future of Syria and the Region", Lebanon would no longer be able to bear the burden of hosting 
the high number of Syrians, if the international community would not invest more in Lebanon. 
Hariri stated in this call for help that investment in Lebanon is an investment that keeps Syrians 
in Lebanon until they are able to return to their country. With this statement, Hariri highlighted 
firstly that Syrians will move from Lebanon, either to Syria or another country, and secondly 
that the efforts made by Lebanon for hosting Syrians should not be taken for granted (Dakroub, 
2017). 
 
6.3 Access to civil documentation  
6.3.1 Legal Residency 
After the Syrian crisis erupted, Syrians could initially relatively easily obtain legal residence 
in Lebanon. As had been the case prior to the crisis, Syrian passport holders received six-month 
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visa stamps, which after six months and after a year could be renewed freely in Lebanon. 
Moreover, Syrians were able to move freely across the Lebanese-Syrian border, before 
regulations became tighter in 2014 (Hägerdal, 2018, p. 3). As of January 2015, a multi-visa 
system was installed for Syrians attempting to enter Lebanon, dividing applicants’ reason for 
travelling to Lebanon into ten categories. Although a visa for being displaced could be granted 
under exceptional circumstances, it is unclear how Syrian refugees are being assessed under 
this category. This tightening of border regulations was enforced by increasing the 
documentation requirements for obtaining a residence permit. Also, the procedure to renew 
residence permits became more complex (Uzelac & Meester, 2018, p. 20). If registered with 
UNHCR, Syrian refugees are required to hand in a housing commitment signed by the landlord 
and certified by the local Muhktar, head of the neighborhood. This certification costs between 
$6,5 and $13. In addition, valid proof of registration with UNHCR, a copy of the ID of the 
landlord and the person applying, three photocopies, and a pledge that the person will not work 
have to be submitted. On top of these requirements, $200 has to be paid for the residence 
permit. For refugees without UNHCR registration, residency can be renewed or granted by 
having a Lebanese sponsor, often in exchange for money or cheap labor, at the price of $200 
per year. Again, the housing commitment, copies of ID cards, a lease agreement, three 
photocopies, and a personal pledge of responsibility signed by the Lebanese sponsor are 
required (Refugees-Lebanon.org, 2016). In May 2015, the Lebanese government ordered 
UNHCR to shut down refugee registration, resulting in a high number of Syrian refugees that 
are not registered. Moreover, it is estimated that over 50 per cent of the refugees have entered 
Lebanon without identity documents, hindering them to apply for legal registration in the first 
place (Syrian Civic Platform, 2017). The deliberately increasing complexity and costs for 
obtaining residence permits have had a tremendous impact on the legal status of Syrians. 
Survey research revealed that as of mid-2018, 76 per cent of the Syrian refugees above the age 
of fifteen do not have legal residency in Lebanon (Uzelac & Meester, 2018, p. 20). As a result, 
these refugees are not allowed to work, and their freedom of movement is limited as they face 
the threat of being detained, deported, and harassed. Moreover, access to (legal) services, such 
as healthcare and education, and civil registration systems is restricted. In early 2017, the 
government decided to waive the high fees for residence permits for refugees registered with 
UNHCR. However, this excludes an estimated half million Syrians not registered with UNHCR 
and the ones that have had a Lebanese sponsor (Atallah & Mahdi, 2017, p. 25).  
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6.3.2 Marriage Registration  
While in Syria religious marriages are easy to register, in Lebanon they are not. As in Jordan, 
marriage registration follows complex and costly procedures. The first step Syrian couples 
have to take, is to be married by an authorized religious authority at the fee of $100. Only 
couples that have legal residency, proof of faith, and a medical report, which costs an additional 
$100 and needs to proof that the person does not have any genetic diseases, are officially 
allowed to marry. After receiving a marriage contract, the Mokhtar should issue a marriage 
certificate within a month after the marriage. The certification fees vary, as some Mukhtars do 
not charge for this service, while others have asked amounts up to $20. In order to finalize the 
marriage registration procedure, the marriage certificate has to be registered at the Foreigners’ 
Registry, first by transferring the certificate the Kalam Nofous, the local civil registry office, 
and then at Personal State Department (PSD) of the governorate where the bride officially 
resides. Besides requiring the marriage contract and certificate, a valid residence permit and 
proof of identity have to be provided at the PSD. In addition, the couple has to pay around $10 
for stamps (Refugees-Lebanon.org, 2018). Yet, most Syrians are not able to complete the 
process, the majority of times because registration requires valid legal residency. Moreover, 
many Syrians entered Lebanon without documentation papers or have lost them, while these 
are required to successfully register. Also, the unfamiliarity with Lebanese laws and procedures 
contributes to the lack of marriage registration, while this is so important for future generations. 
With 76 per cent of the refugee households in Lebanon living below the poverty line, of which 
58 per cent lives in extreme poverty, the costs attached to marriage registration is significant 
(VASyR, 2017, p. 60). For couples married in Syria, but who did not register the marriage 
before fleeing to Lebanon, difficulties arise as the Lebanese law does not oblige couples to 
register such marriages, as there is no official procedure provided by law for these types of 
registration. Yet, without proof of marriage, couples face challenges accessing birth 
registration procedures and other civil documentation, such as family booklets. For these cases, 
it is reported that couples could enter the procedures as Shari’a courts have issued documents 
stating that the couple was already married. This practice, however, is not applied to women 
unofficially married in Syria that have come to Lebanon without husbands (NRC, 2014, p. 11) 
 
6.3.3 Birth Registration 
The legal and administrative barriers put in place by the Lebanese government results in the 
inability of 83 per cent of the Syrian families in Lebanon to complete the birth registration 
procedures (VASyR, 2017, p. 14). The procedure follows four steps, of which the first three 
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steps need to be finalized within the first year after birth, in order to avoid a costly judicial 
process to acquire necessary documentation for the registration. During the first two steps, the 
parent should obtain a birth notification from an authorized birth attendant, which has to be 
handed in at the Mukhtar from the area of the child’s birth. The Mukhtar provides the parents 
with a birth certificate. A marriage certificate and identity documents are required: either ID 
cards, valid passports, or family booklets, and a fee of up to $20 has to be paid, depending on 
the Mukhtar’s demands. Step three consists of registration at the Kalam Nofous, which will fill 
in the date of registration on the birth certificate. Over one-third of the parents were able to 
complete this step. The fourth step is completed after registration at the Foreigners’ Register at 
the PSD. During this step, the parents need to present the marriage certificate again and a valid 
residence permit. As the vast majority of Syrians are not in the possession of this permit, the 
majority of children born to Syrian parents have been unable to be registered (NRC, 2015, p. 
13). As of September 2017, this requirement has been eased as proof of legal residency is only 
required from one parent, instead of both. In total, the birth registration process costs between 
$15 and $35 (VASyR, 2017, p. 14).  
 
Parents are still facing many challenges, particularly the major problem of the lack of civil 
documentation and the lack of a valid residency visa has hindered the process. Not only does 
the lack of a permit prevent parents from finishing the third step, it also makes parents afraid 
of travelling and approaching the authorities during earlier steps in the process. However, as 
identified by NRC, the most impacting barrier is the lack of information on the procedure and 
likewise the required documentation during each step. Inconsistency by the authorities 
regarding the requirement of documentation enhances the confusion refugee parents 
experience. To cope with these challenges, families have taken drastic measures. Some families 
reported having returned to Syria to give birth, while others made sure their baby would be 
registered in Syria by smuggling the baby across the border into Syria. Families have also 
resorted to buying fake documents to obtain the documents unlawfully from Syria via a third 
person, or to use civil documentation from people close to them (NRC, 2015, pp. 19-26). 
Without birth registration, a child born in Lebanon will be at increased risk of remaining 
stateless and will be hindered in enrolling in education, accessing healthcare, including 
immunization, and enjoying the freedom of movement (Cherri, 2018). As there is an increasing 
focus on return to Syria by the government, it seems that the government slowly but surely is 
realizing that proper documentation is necessary to facilitate return. Without proof of parentage 
over a child, Syrian refugees are not able to leave Lebanese territory with their child and are 
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thereby unable to return to Syria. Although the exact number is unclear, Gebran Bassil, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated during an interview in 2017 that “there are approximately 
111,000 unregistered childbirths that are at risk of being rejected entry into Syria in the future 
due to lack of documentation” (Atallah & Mahdi, 2017, p. 38). Besides having eased 
regulations regarding the residence permit and the requirement of the permit during birth 
registration, mid-2018 the government also waived the one-year timeframe for registration of 
birth for Syrian children born in Lebanon between January 2011 and February 2018 (Cherri, 
2018). 
 
6.4 Access to services 
As Lebanon is not a member state of any of the refugee treaties, nor has any form of refugee 
protection in the national legislation, Lebanon resorts to the 2003 Memorandum of 
Understanding with UNHCR that underlines that Lebanon does not consider itself as an asylum 
country, but permits UNHCR “to register asylum seekers and conduct refugee status 
determination” (Janmyr, 2016, pp. 6, 10). Although the UN was initially mainly responsible 
for the refugee crisis management, since 2014 the government gradually became more 
involved. Contrary to the purpose of refugee response, governmental actions were not aimed 
at providing conflict-sensitive refugee protection as it increasingly placed restrictions on 
(I)NGO interventions to deter permanent settlement in Lebanon. However, as certain 
government ministers started to realize what challenges the enormous influx of refugees placed 
on their sectors and the potential offered by aid money from donors, the interest in response 
increased, resulting in a somewhat stiff cooperation between aid agencies and the government 
(Uzelac & Meester, 2018, p. 48). In 2016, after funds were provided by the international 
community to pay for the education of refugees as well as Lebanese children, the Ministry of 
Education opened up access to education for Syrian children, whom previously had been 
rejected. By expanding the number of two-shift schools, the enrollment of refugee children 
aged between six and fourteen increased to 70 per cent in 2017, compared to 52 per cent in 
2016. However, not all of them are necessarily in school all the time, quality education is 
lacking as schools are overburdened, and discrimination is a common problem. While a 
memorandum signed in 2012 states that all Syrian children can enroll in education regardless 
of their legal status, in practice, students without residence permits have often been denied 
access. Moreover, enrollment in higher education is low (VASyR, 2017, p. 32).  
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Both registered and unregistered refugees can access primary healthcare facilities, offered by 
a partnership of the Ministry of Social Affairs with UNHCR and other (I)NGOs. UNHCR 
provide subsidized rates for medical consultations for which Syrians pay one-third of the price 
Lebanese communities pay. In addition, acute medication, ultrasounds for pregnant women, 
and vaccines are free of charge, and medication for chronic illnesses are provided for a small 
price. Referrals to secondary and tertiary healthcare facilities are covered by UNHCR as they 
pay between 75 and 90 per cent of the hospital fees, depending on the socio-economic 
vulnerability of the refugee. The same regulation applies for child delivery and life-threatening 
emergencies. Yet, UNHCR stops with its assistance when the conditions are no longer life 
threatening, while it remains unclear what ‘life-threatening’ exactly means. Many refugees 
have been unable to pay the remaining hospital fee, resulting in dire conditions in which 
refugees have been reportedly forced to hand in civil documents are a guarantee for payment, 
returning back to Syria for free treatment, or leaving the healthcare facility without notice, 
which especially in the case of giving birth has severe consequences (Lebanon Support, 2016, 
pp. 8-10, 20-21).  
 
Ever since the sixties, when economic prosperity demanded more labour, Syrian labourers have 
worked in low skilled sectors in Lebanon, such as construction and agriculture. At its height in 
1972, 90 per cent of the construction workers in Lebanon were Syrian. Bilateral agreements 
outlined the conditions regarding labour flows between the two countries, stating freedom of 
movement and the right to work in both countries upon receiving a work permit. The 
International Labour Organization estimated that around 300.000 Syrians worked in Lebanon 
prior to the Syrian crisis. However, as a large number of Syrians entered the country as a result 
of the conflict and settled mainly down in the poorest areas of Lebanon, the government altered 
its labour policies. As a result, Syrians are allowed to only work in construction, agriculture, 
and environment, employers are only allowed to hire Syrians if unable to find Lebanese 
workers, and the ratio Lebanese to foreign workers should be 10:1. Moreover, Syrians with 
work permits, which could only be obtained with a valid residence permit, lose their UNHCR 
status and the subsequent access to humanitarian assistance (Bou Khater, 2017, p. 4). In 2015, 
Syrians were allowed to work without a work permit when having a Lebanese sponsor. Yet, 
this increases their vulnerability, as these Syrians do not have provision of labor rights (Atallah 
& Mahdi, 2017, p. 25). As mentioned earlier, the vast majority of Syrians are living in poverty. 
The average monthly income for working men in 2017 was $206 and for women $158 
(VASyR, 2017, p. 71).  
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 Answer on research questions 
This thesis has investigated civil registration systems in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon by 
providing an answer to the questions: What explains the different implementation of civil 
registration systems for Syrian refugees in the host countries Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon? In 
order to answer these questions, an assessment has been made through the analysis of the three 
host governments, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon.  
 
In Jordan, 80 per cent of the Syrians live outside of the refugee camps. The majority of them 
have settled in the north of Jordan, the same area that hosts the most vulnerable Jordanian 
communities. As a result, the Jordanian host communities increasingly expressed their 
frustrations, forcing the government to decrease their welcoming approach towards the 
refugees. As of 2014, the government adopted a more restrictive policy, including tighter 
border restrictions, the cancellation of free healthcare, and more complex requirements for a 
MoI card, which consequently impacted the ability to acquire additional civil documentation. 
Yet, as Jordan has a long-standing history of taking in refugees, the government is experienced 
in capitalizing on international support by using its role as host as leverage during negotiations 
with the international community. As a result of the balancing act between pleasing the 
Jordanian citizens and taking advantage of foreign aid, which due to the country’s economic 
hardships is necessary to survive, the Jordanian government has developed the ‘most 
sophisticated’ regional response, combining refugee and developmental responses in one plan. 
Consequently, after the initial implementation of complex civil registration procedures, the 
government also eased the regulations for civil documentation. Confiscated civil documents 
have been returned, requirements for obtaining a MoI card, marriage certificates and birth 
certificates have been eased, and UNHCR has again been allowed to issue ASCs. Yet, the 
protracted refugee situation is taking its toll: as international support is decreasing, the 
governmental call for return is increasing.  
 
In Turkey, the government has actively taken the responsibility to provide effective protection 
by adopting the temporary protection regime. Under this regime, all Syrian refugees have been 
able to acquire civil documentation due to the implementation of inclusive civil registrations 
systems. The relatively humane refugee response has enhanced Turkey’s international and 
national prestige, likewise, the majority of Syrian refugees are supportive of Erdoğan’s AKP 
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party. However, due to the arrival of a large number of Syrians, public opinion was increasingly 
more critical, resulting in the government ending the open-door policy in 2015, discouraging 
legal work opportunities for Syrians through complex requirements, and adopting a moderate 
approach concerning the naturalization plan. Moreover, through the EU-Turkey deal, which 
has been a direct consequence of Turkey’s geographical proximity to Europe, the government 
negotiated for concessions beneficial for Turkish citizens, such as visa-free travelling to the 
EU. After the coup in mid-2016, Erdoğan’s crackdown on society included targeting specific 
(I)NGOs. Many Syrians were relieved that the coup failed, as they feared that political change 
could have meant the end to Turkey’s protection regime. Although some (I)NGOs have been 
forced to shut down operation, the government’s refugee policy, however, remained 
unchanged. Yet, societal backlash against Syrians increased post-coup, as grievances toward 
the government were increasingly channeled toward Syrian refugees. As the government 
increasingly realized at what social and political costs it is supporting Syrian refugees, the 
discussion on return to Syria intensified. The first (properly documented) Syrians have returned 
to secured areas in Syria, which have, in line with Turkey’s refugee response, been repaired 
with infrastructure and facilities.   
 
In Lebanon, its complex history has left a mark on the country. After the Lebanese civil war 
ended in 1990, the power-sharing system along sectarian lines was reinstalled in the political 
arena. Consequently, decision making in times of crisis has been complex and has often 
resulted in political deadlock, as was the case during the first years of the Syrian influx. Despite 
this situation, Lebanon clearly articulated its will not to make similar mistakes as it had done 
with the Palestinian refugees in the past, whom now permanently reside in Lebanon. Although 
Lebanon announced its neutral position toward the Syrian conflict, spillover of the Syrian crisis 
which included heightened conflict along sectarian lines, has threatened Lebanon’s national 
security. This enhanced the fear of a shift in the demographic balance as Syrians are 
predominantly Sunni Muslims. After the formation of a new government in 2014, the dominant 
Lebanese view that portrays Syrian refugees as a burden, translated into policy aimed at 
restricting further influx and deterring Syrians from settling permanently. Consequently, the 
Lebanese government deliberately implemented complex and costly civil registration systems, 
with the result that over three-quarters of the Syrians do not have legal residency, while this is 
crucial to accessing other civil registration procedures. Despite this governmental approach, 
some ministries decided to improve their sectors with international support, in return for 
including Syrians. Yet, as the international support to Lebanon is decreasing, the call for return 
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of Syrians becomes louder. As the realisation that proper documentation is needed for return 
slowly increases, the government has taken limited steps to improve the situation, particularly 
concerning birth registration. However, the government are a long way from recovering the 
lack of documentation of Syrians in Lebanon.   
 
Now that an overview has been given on the three different countries, a clear answer on the 
research question could be formulated. The difference in implemented civil registration 
systems is determined by each host country’s social, political, and economic situation before 
and during the Syrian refugee influx and the extent to which the Syrian refugee crisis has 
impacted the country, positively and negatively. The barriers Syrian refugees experience while 
attempting to obtain civil documentation mainly depend on the implemented civil registration 
systems of the host country, which thereby also influence refugees’ access to services. In 
Turkey, the government has adopted the temporary protection regime, which includes refugee-
sensitive civil registration systems. To obtain the temporary protection status, Syrian refugees 
are not expected to have their civil documents and are allowed to orally provide information 
on their identity. Moreover, the kimlik counts as replacement for absent identity documents, 
enabling all Syrian refugees to access additional civil registration systems. In Jordan, the civil 
registration systems have continuously been adapted, as there is a relatively good relationship 
with the international community. Yet, despite the easing of procedures, particularly the 
procedures for a MoI card, a whole group of Syrian refugees is still left aside. Therefore, among 
other reasons, a large group of Syrian refugees in Jordan still struggle to obtain civil 
documentation. In Lebanon, however, Syrian refugees are facing the biggest obstacles while 
trying to obtain civil documentation. By implementing complex procedures for residence visas, 
the government deliberately prevents Syrian refugees from acquiring additional civil 
documentation.  
 
Over the course of eight years, different factors continuously have influenced the host 
governments’ refugee response. These refugee responses are the product of a continuous effort 
by the government to determine what decisions are most beneficial for the country, or in some 
cases for the government. A variety of factors influence this decision making process, as this 
research has pointed out. In Turkey, the pre-conditions have been more favorable: economic 
strength, an extensive social welfare system, and the geographical proximity to Europe that 
provided Turkey with a good position to negotiate beneficial agreements. In addition, the 
government has seemed determined to use the refugee presence to improve its political 
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position. Moreover, the continued strengthening of the governmental power, particularly post-
coup, has largely silenced critical voices in Turkey. In Jordan, the relatively positive experience 
with previous refugee influxes has made the government knowledgeable on the opportunities 
for the country. Therefore, although the country is dealing with economic hardships and 
structural challenges, it has been able to combine refugee and host community assistance in 
one national plan, which largely prevented national protests. Yet, the government needed the 
time to develop this plan, which explains its alteration of the refugee response and specifically 
the civil registration system. In Lebanon, the political and ethnical weak stability of the country 
are the main factors that have influenced the adoption of the deliberately complex civil 
registration systems, which also is the reason for the political immobility. Moreover, the bad 
experience with the Palestinian refugees has created the fear for the permanent settlement of 
Syrian refugees, hence the will to not document Syrian refugees properly.   
 
The Syrian refugee crisis revealed the unwillingness of many countries to host refugees. The 
‘sacrifice’ Syria’s neighboring countries have made, provided them with a lot of opportunities, 
as donors have highly funded the reception of refugees in the region. The international 
community has repeatedly praised these three host countries for taking in Syrian, when no other 
countries have been willing to. The host countries have utilized this leverage for beneficial 
agreements and monetary aid, which also have benefited the host communities, strengthened 
developmental efforts, and enhanced capacity building of the (local) government(s). In return, 
host governments have provided better assistance to Syrian refugees, including easing civil 
registration procedures. Moreover, this context provided the opportunity to improve the 
country’s and/or the government’s image and subsequently support, nationally and 
internationally. However, despite these advantages, this situation has ‘forced’ Jordan, Turkey, 
and Lebanon to host the large number of refugees within their borders. The magnitude of the 
influx, as well as the unexpected long-term refugee presence, has placed a heavy burden on all 
host countries, which particularly have been felt by the weak economic countries Jordan and 
Lebanon. The internal political situations and maintaining political and social stability have 
played a major role in the refugee response. Host governments have continuously been forced 
to balance their refugee response, including the civil registration procedures, in order to prevent 
societal backlash. Moreover, the host governments and/or the host communities have 
increasingly been fearing permanent settlement of the refugees, often fueled by tensions within 
the host communities and in the case of Lebanon, fueled by previous experiences with refugee 
populations.  
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Although providing a safe place for Syrian refugees has presented the host countries with 
positive opportunities, the heavy toll on the countries has been considerably more impactful. 
The gap between international recognition in the form of monetary aid and other advantages, 
and the actual social, political, and economic costs the host countries have paid for hosting 
Syrian refugees, has resulted in a different refugee response in each host country. Particularly 
now that international aid is decreasing, the discussion on the future of Syrian refugees has 
been initiated, as host countries have reached their limits. Regardless of whether refugees 
remain in the host countries or return back to Syria after the war, adequate civil documentation 
is of crucial importance. By adopting inclusive and effective civil registration systems that 
include refugee-sensitive measures, host countries can facilitate successful integration of 
Syrian in their societies, benefiting from refugees at their full potential. Moreover, adopting 
such systems could facilitate a better and safer return to Syria. This research has demonstrated 
that host countries are yet to realize these systems, however, host governments have taken 
initial steps to improve their civil registration systems. Nevertheless, a lot of change is still 
required to ensure that Syrian will be able to return to their homes in a safe manner. Although 
Turkey has implemented civil registration systems that relatively successfully provide Syrian 
refugees with civil documentation, the current civil registration systems in Jordan and Lebanon 
in particular continues to enhance the problem of lacking civil documentation. This does not 
only increase the risks of statelessness for Syrian refugees, particularly the children born to 
Syrian parents in exile but also endangers their link to Syria and the Syrian nationality. 
 
7.2 Limitations  
This thesis successfully described the civil registration systems and their consequences thus, 
limitations are bound to the extent of data-collection and registration procedures which have 
been highlighted due to the scope of the research. Firstly, refugee populations within the three 
host countries from other origins than Syria have not been taken into consideration. Secondly, 
this research only focused on three neighboring host countries, while there are other large host 
countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, or Germany. Lastly, as mentioned earlier, Syrian refugees are 
not a homogenous entity and include Syrians Arabs, Palestine refugees from Syria, 
unregistered stateless persons from Syria called Maktoum, and stateless Kurds registered as 
‘foreigners’. In short, this Master’s thesis research and its findings should be expanded and 
elaborated on in further research, which includes the above-mentioned limitations.  
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